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On the morning of August 9, 1997, five people were found
shot to death execution style in a home in the 100 block of West
French Place in San Antonio, Texas.' The wrists of the victims were
bound with duct tape and then their lives taken-each with a shot
to the head.2  The killing of these five individuals, known as the
French Place Murders, was the largest mass murder reported in the
modem history of San Antonio, Texas.3  Suspicions quickly
emerged that the gruesome slayings were connected with the
criminal activities of the Mexican Mafia, a prison-based gang en-
gaged in criminal activities, which extends beyond the walls of the
5Texas prison system.
Federal prosecutors of the Western District of Texas were able
to bring ten Mexican Mafia gang members to justice for the French
Place Murders and others by utilizing a powerful weapon in their
arsenal, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act,
commonly referred to as RICO [hereinafter RICO]. As hoped by
1. Anita McDivitt, Execution-Style Killings Rock Family Father, Daughter Among
Victims of City's Worst Mass-Murder in Memory, SAN ANTONIO ExPRESS-NEWS, Aug. 10,
1997, at IA.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Bill Hendricks & John Tedesco, Mafia Raids Dawn on Mexican Mafia: Au-
thorities Collect Drugs, Weapons in Citywide Gang Sweep, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEwS,
Oct. 4, 1997, at lB.
5. Id.; John MacCormick, Nueces DA Targets Youth Gangs, SAN ANTONIO
ExPRESS-NEWS, June 14, 1998, at IA; Marty Sabota, Suspect in 1994 Triple Shooting
Jailed, SAN ANTONIO ExPRESS-NEws, Nov. 6, 1997, at 2B.
6. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1994) [hereinafter RICO]; see also Maro Rob-
bins, Gang Member to Ask For Death, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEwS, Mar. 5, 1999, at 2B.
Increasingly, legislators and law enforcement have recognized that using the RICO
statute can effectively attack a criminal organization such as the Mexican Mafia. 10
Mexican Mafia Members Receive Life Sentences, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEwS, Sept. 7,
1997, at 7B (quoting U.S. Attorney Nora Manella who stated that sentences result-
ing from the utilization of the RICO statute demonstrated "an assurance that 'La
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many,7 these ten men were found guilty and later sentenced to life
imprisonment without parole for their criminal activities associated
8
with the Mexican Mafia including the French Place Murders.
RICO allows the federal government to eradicate a criminal
organization such as the Mexican Mafia through the prosecution of
its members and associates for criminal offenses and other acts they
commit for the purpose of maintaining the criminal organization
and fulfilling its criminal objective. 9 In particular, RICO created a
new form of conspiracy, which has proven to be a valuable weapon
in the federal government's ongoing mission to dismantle gangs
such as the Mexican Mafia, which are organized for the pursuit of
criminal activities. RICO conspiracy is considered a more efficient,
effective and expansive form of conspiracy.10  Unlike traditional
forms of conspiracy, RICO conspiracy allows the government for
the first time to prosecute numerous defendants for seemingly un-
related crimes and conspiracies in a single trial." In essence, the
enactment of RICO has contributed to the rise of the "mega trial"
phenomenon, where numerous defendants are prosecuted to-
gether.1
2
In a multi-defendant prosecution, each defendant must con-
tend with the danger that the case against him will be tainted by
evidence presented against his co-defendants that "spills-over" in
the minds of the jurors and taints their decision in regards to his
individual culpability. 3  Traditionally, courts have weighed the
prejudice against the defendant, the "spill-over" effect inherent in
Eme' members [in Los Angeles] are not immune from investigation, prosecution
and imprisonment."); Prosecutors Seek Ways to Continue Crackdown on Mexican Mafia
Gang, SAN ANTONIO ExPREss-NEws, Sept. 22, 1997, at 15A (reviewing the recent
RICO prosecution of nineteen gang members in Los Angeles, CA).
7. Maro Robbins, Gang Member To Ask For Death, SAN ANTONIO ExPRESS-NEWS,
Mar. 5, 1999, at 2B.
8. Maro Robbins, Last Gang Member Given Life Sentence, SAN ANTONIO ExPREss-
NEWS, July 10, 1999, at 2B.
9. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 589 (1981).
10. Id.
11. United States v. Sutherland, 656 F.2d 1181, 1192 (5th Cir. 1981) (stating
that "a series of agreements that under pre-RICO law would constitute multiple
conspiracies could, under RICO, be tried as a single 'enterprise' conspiracy");
United States v. Elliot, 571 F.2d 880 (5th Cir. 1978). In this case, six defendants
and thirty-seven unindicted co-conspirators were suspected in more than twenty
separate criminal pursuits, but the government was only required to charge a sin-
gle conspiracy to violate a substantive RICO provision. Id.
12. See generally United States v. Andrews, 754 F. Supp. 1161, 1169 (N.D. Ill.
1990) (illustrating a multi-defendant conspiracy prosecution) .
13. United States v. Zafiro, 945 F.2d 881, 885-86 (7th Cir. 1991).
22972001]
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all multi-defendant trials, with the government's burden of present-
ing a meaningful and efficient case against the defendants to de-
termine what justice requires. 14 Most courts including the United
States Supreme Court have held that it is more fair and just to allow
the government to prosecute the defendants together than to sever
their cases, finding that the "spill-over" effect although present did
not violate the constitutional rights of the defendant. 5
Unforeseen by its drafters, however, RICO conspiracy created
an enhanced "spill-over" effect.' Existing criminal procedural pro-
tections for misjoinder fail to sufficiently protect RICO conspiracy
defendants from the enhanced "spill-over" effect created by RICO
conspiracy.17 Thus, the RICO conspiracy defendant is denied the
opportunity to present his case to an impartial jury in violation of
the Sixth Amendment. Furthermore, the current inadequate
procedural due process protections allow the RICO conspiracy de-
fendant to be deprived of his liberty without due process of law in
violation of the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause of the
United States Constitution."
This article proposes that the Federal Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure be amended in a way that accounts for the enhanced "spill-
over" effect created by RICO conspiracy and comports with the re-
quirements of procedural due process. With such a revision to the
rules, RICO conspiracy prosecutions will provide the RICO con-
spiracy defendant with a meaningful way to present his defense to
an impartial jury. Towards this end, this article presents the bene-
fits of utilizing RICO conspiracy in dismantling the Mexican Mafia
and its detrimental effect on procedural due process through a dis-
cussion of the relevant aspects of the RICO statute, developments
in case law regarding RICO, and the recent prosecution of ten
Mexican Mafia gang members of San Antonio, Texas in United
States v. Robert "Beaver" Perez.
Part I describes the Mexican Mafia and the events that oc-
curred in San Antonio which allowed the government to utilize
RICO to assault the Mexican Mafia. Part II analyzes the RICO stat-
ute to establish its application to gangs. Part III examines specific
14. United States v. Zanin, 831 F.2d 740, 744 (7th Cir. 1987).
15. Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 539-40 (1993).
16. Infra notes 287-345 and accompanying text.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. See generally U.S. CONST. amends. V, VI.
2298 [Vol. 27:4
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aspects of the jury trial in United States v. Robert "Beaver" Perez, the ef-
fect of the RICO conspiracy provision on procedural due process,
how due process is implicated in RICO prosecutions, and proposes
an additional procedural protection to be incorporated into the
joinder-severance process of federal criminal procedure.
I. THE MEXICAN MAFIA: THE NATURE OF A GANG
A. Composition & Structure
The Mexican Mafia also known as the "Mexikanemi or La
eme" is a prison-based gang, which exists and operates beyond the
walls of the Texas prison system as well. 2° The city of San Antonio is
designated as the "capital" of the gang.21 The Mexican Mafia arose
in the 1980's in the Texas prison system when primarily Hispanic
prisoners formed this gang to protect each other from predatory
attacks during a period of time when the Texas prison system was
the site of violence and turmoil.22 The newly formed Mexican Ma-
fia sought to generate funds outside the walls of the prisons to help
its incarcerated members with legal expenses and commissary ex-
20. Thaddeus Herrick, 10 Texas Gangsters Found Guilty of Racketeering and Con-
spiracy, Hous. CHRON., Mar. 4, 1999, at BI. The Texas Department of Criminal jus-
tice reports that there are approximately 1,400 Mexican Mafia members in state
prisons. Id.
21. THE MEXICAN MAFIA, MEXIKANEMI CONSTITUTION [hereinafter MAFIA
CONSTITUTION] (stating "[T]hings in general: 1.) San Antonio is to be acknowl-
edged as the central headquarters of Mexikanemi here in Texas. The rest of the
major cities and/or towns will be: Austin, Houston, Corpus Christi, Dallas, Ft.
Wort, [sic] Lubbock, Amarillo, Midland, Odessa, Laredo, El Paso and the Valley
... ). The Mexican Mafia created a Constitution entitled the "Mexikanemi Consti-
tution." Maro Robbins, Three Plead In Mass Slaying, SAN ANTONIO ExPREss-NEWS,
Dec. 19, 1998, at lB. This document was seized by local authorities in a search of
one of the homes of an alleged Mexican Mafia member. Id. Jesus "Buzzard" Tor-
res, a gang member who feared for his life after his relations with La Eme mem-
bers went sour, turned to police for protection and revealed the story of this con-
stitution. Maro Robbins, Gang Turncoat Tells of Tight Operation, SAN ANTONIO
EXPRESS-NEWS, Jan. 22, 1999, at 2B. Torres, who was a personal secretary to the
gang's San Antonio leader, was responsible for retyping and distributing the
gang's constitution to its newest members. Id. This document, more like an or-
ganizational charter in form than a constitution, explains numerous aspects of the
nature of the Mexican Mafia. MAFIA CONSTITUTION, supra.
22. Maro Robbins, Anatomy of a Prison Based Gang: Six Weeks of Testimony
Weaves a Tapestry of Heavy-Duty Violence, SAN ANTONIO ExPRESS-NEWS, Feb. 28, 1999,
at lB (noting that a state official who monitors prison gangs testified that the
prison gang arose in the Texas prison system during the early 80's amid sweeping
prison reform).
2001] 2299
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penses, and to address the financial needs of members' families
23burdened by their loved ones' imprisonment. 24
The Mexican Mafia has a defined structure and hierarchy.
The leaders of the Mexican Mafia are referred to as "President,"
"Vice President," "General," "Captain," "Lieutenant," and "Ser-
geant." [sic] 2  The members are referred to as soldiers or "Cana-,,26
les. Members of the Mexican Mafia are required to recruit new
members and they are ultimately responsible for the loyalty of
those new recruits.2' An essential element of the Mexican Mafia is
28maintaining communication between its members. In addition,
23. MAFIA CONSTrrUTION, supra note 21 (stating that "[r]esponsibilities and
Obligations: 1). It is any merecidos obligation, under the ranks of captain, to write
the unit he was released from, share news, help with money or whatever favor(s)
are possible for him to do. Anyone that goes home and does not help with money
or favors and returns back to the system should not expect help support from the
Mercidos here (system). Anyone that goes home and does not write and returns
back to the system shall be the prime candidate for any job that needs to be done
see also Robbins, supra note 22, at lB (quoting gang-member Jesus "Buzzard"
Torres who stated that, in 1985, the Mexican Mafia was "a movement to help each
other like a family").
24. MAFIA CONSTITUTION, supra note 21.
25. Id.
26. First Superseding Indictment, United States v. Perez, No. SA-98-CR-265-
EP, at 3 (W.D. Tex. filed Nov. 19, 1998) [hereinafter Perez Indictment].
27. MAFIA CONSTITUTION, supra note 21. This states that
any and every member of Mexikanemi must represent Mexikanemi re-
spectively, honorable and proudly and must never let the flag which he
carries and represents fall. All Meridos are responsible for recruiting
and/or picking up new members. The soldier who recommends a mem-
ber is responsible for his own recommendation. Whether the recom-
mendation results honorably or in betrayal. This is to say if the
recommendation becomes a good soldier, it is honorable on the
recommendator's [sic] part. In this same instance, if the recommenda-
tion becomes a traitor the soldier who recommended the traitor is re-
sponsible to take action against the traitor as soon as possible, utilizing
whichever means are necessary. In a case where a recommendator [sic]
cannot reach the traitor, then the brother that's the nearest to the traitor
must execute the action ....
Id. (alteration in original).
28. MAFIA CONSTITUTION, supra note 21 (stating that " [ i] t is the responsibility
of the lieutenant of each unit town or county jail to keep in communication with
all other units, towns and countyjails. To keep informed of what is happening. It
is not necessary for the lieutenant to write personally he has the right to apoint
[sic] a brother to help him write. The communication of information is impor-
tant. Many problems can be avoided by using our constitution and keeping close
communication with other lieutenants.). In San AntonioJesus "Buzzard" Tor-
res was charged with ensuring that communication was maintained between the
members by the local leader, Robert "Beaver" Perez. Robbins, supra note 21, at
2B.
2300 [Vol. 27:4
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gang members of the Mexican Mafia are required to be loyal to the
criminal organization.
B. Purpose
The Mexican Mafia characterizes itself as a criminal organiza-
tion by stating in its "Constitution" that "being a criminal organiza-
tion we work in any criminal aspect or interest for the benefit and
advancement of Mexikanemi. We shall deal in drugs, contract kill-
ings, prostitution, large scale robbery, gambling, weapons and eve-
rything imaginable. 3  La eme is a criminal organization, which
operates as a business for the financial benefit of its members and
for the continued operation and existence of La eme."
The "business" of La eme includes extortion, retaliation, rob-
bery, assault, murder and narcotic trafficking. 2 Most of the income
generated by the organization is obtained through extorting sums
of money from persons engaged in street crimes such as selling• 33
drugs and prostitution. This extortion money constitutes a form
of "tax." Initially, the amount of the "tax' was ten percent of what35
the person made. As time has passed, the amount of tax has be-
come what the gang believes the person can pay.36 This "tax" is re-
ferred to as the "ten percent" or "the dime. When people have
failed to pay the tax they have been threatened, robbed, assaulted
or killed by well armed Soldiers or "Canales" who work together in
groups called "crews."3 In addition to extensive practice of extor-
29. MAFIA CONSTITUTION, supra note 21 (proclaiming that "which ever mem-
ber of the Mexikanemi (and it does not matter if it's the President, Vice President,
Generals, Captains, Lieutenants, Segeants [sic] or Soldiers) violates the rules of
Mexikanemi in any manner, they will pay and have to suffer the consequences").
30. Id. The Mexican Mafia gang also refers to itself in its "literature" as
"Mexikanemi" and "La Eme."
31. Perez Indictment, supra note 26, at 4.
32. MAFIA CONSTUITrON, supra note 21.
33. Perez Indictment, supra note 26, at 4.
34. MAFIA CONSTrrUTION, supra note 21; Robbins, supra note 21, at 2B (relat-
ing story told by Mexican Mafia member who reports collecting extortion money
from drug dealers).
35. Perez Indictment, supra note 26, at 4.
36. Id.
37. MAFIA CONSTrrUTION, supra note 21 (stating "if any one of us in Mexika-
nemi has a business or interest we must put up 10% of the profits for the rest of
the organization. This said 10% should always be used wisely and constructively
for the interest of Mexikanemi in general, in what ever form (s) serve the best pur-
pose....").
38. Perez Indictment, supra note 26, at 5 (noting that the weapons used by
2001] 2301
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tion, the Mexican Mafia is involved in the sale and distribution of
illegal drugs including heroin, cocaine, and marijuana.' 9
The Mexican Mafia condones murder as a means to further its
existence. The acceptance of murder as a part of the gang's busi-
ness is explicitly stated in the gang's "Constitution" where it states:
"[E] ach member of Mexikanemi shall definitely be willing to sacri-
fice his life or at the same time, take lives any time that this honor-
able act is necessary."4° In San Antonio, Mexican Mafia turf wars
contributed to approximately 229 killings in 1993, climaxing a
bloody four-year period in San Antonio history when murders to-
taled 880. Many of the murders related to local gang wars had a
devastating effect on San Antonio youth, with statistics indicating
that juvenile-related murders rose seventy-nine percent from 199042
to 1995. The majority of these murders resulted from power
struggles within the Mexican Mafia gang and narcotics dealings.43
Subsequent to the convictions of several Mexican Mafia leaders and
their top soldiers of federal conspiracy charges in 1994, the num-
ber of murders dropped sharply and immediately.4  Murders
45dropped to 194 in 1994 and 140 the following year.
In 1997, incidences of violent crime were on the decline in San
Antonio,46 however, news of the French Place murders with the
possibility of Mexican Mafia involvement filled numerous San An-
tonio residents with fear of renewed gang violence in their com-
munity.47 At the time, the San Antonio Police Department re-
ported that local street gangs claimed a membership of 17,000 with
about 1,500 of them being considered "hard-core loyalists who en-
gage in regular drive-by shootings, assaults and other violent
the crews to intimidate or otherwise harm person owing the tax are either dis-
carded or cleaned with alcohol by Soldiers wearing rubber gloves); Herrick, supra
note 20, at BI (noting that Mexican Mafia members gave the ten percent street tax
collected from drug dealers and prostitutes to their leader, Robert "Beaver" Perez
to redistribute to the gang's imprisoned members).
39. Perez Indictment, supra note 26, at 5; see also Herrick, supra note 20, at BI.
40. MAFIA CONsTrTuTION, supra note 21.
41. Bill Hendricks, Autos Deadlier Than Guns- More Road Deaths Than Homicides
in S.A. for First Time in 12 Years, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEws, Jan. 2, 1997, at IA.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. E.g., Maro Robbins, Judge Dismisses Gang Trial Juror, SAN ANTONIO ExPREss-
NEws,Jan. 14, 1999, at 3B.
2302 [Vol. 27:4
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crim es.
48
Community and governmental leaders, deeply concerned for
the welfare of the citizenry, implemented numerous actions to
solve gang violence,49 while law enforcement officials struggled with
the formidable task of bringing murderers to justice with little
physical evidence and no witnesses willing to testify." Afraid for
their lives and the lives of their families, residents of gang-ravaged
neighborhoods who had vital information about gang related
criminal activities, including eyewitness accounts of murders, would
not testify against known killers associated with the Mexican Ma-
fia.
51
C. A Case Study: United States v. Robert "Beaver" Perez
Although local and federal law enforcement officials strongly
suspected that members of the Mexican Mafia were responsible for
many of the unsolved murders in San Antonio, including the
French Place murders, they were frustrated because they did not
have enough physical evidence to link specific individuals to the
52 53killings. Finally, there came a break in the investigation. A
young man, named Frank Estrada, detained in the Bexar County
Jail, begged officials with the Federal Bureau of Investigations
(FBI) to protect him from the Mexican Mafia in exchange for in-
formation.54
Frank Estrada, a member of the Mexican Mafia, revealed that
one of the Generals of the Mexican Mafia had put a contract out
on his life. 5 In exchange for protection he agreed to provide the
FBI with information about numerous unsolved murders related to
Mexican Mafia gang activities. 6 Frank Estrada revealed that he had
48. Adolpho Pesquera, Gang Truce: Two Years of Fragile Peace, SAN ANTONIO
EXPRESS-NEWS, Mar. 23, 1997, at 1A.
49. Id.
50. Interview with Bill Baumann & David Counts, Assistant United States At-
torneys of the United States Attorney's Office for the Western District of Texas,
San Antonio, Tex. (Feb. 22, 2000) [hereinafter Interview with Baumann &
Counts].
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Maro Robbins, 7 Mafia Snitches Ready to Disappear, SAN ANTONIO ExPREsS-
NEWS, Feb. 22, 1999, at IA.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. Another gang-member, defendant Daniel Angel Tavitas who partici-
2001] 2303
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been the triggerman in at least seven unsolved murders.57 Later,
Estrada testified that he had actually committed more murders, al-
though he could not remember exactly how many murders he had
committed.5" Faced with unusual circumstances and hoping to
bring those responsible for these murders to justice, the govern-
ment agreed to give Estrada transactional immunity59 in exchange
for his testimony, which ultimately led to the convictions of ten
Mexican Mafia members. 60
Based on information provided by Frank Estrada, along with
other confidential informants and unindicted co-conspirators, in-
vestigators were able to gather evidence that supported a two-count
indictment against sixteen alleged Mexican Mafia members. 1
Count one was a substantive RICO offense and count two was for a
violation of RICO conspiracy. 6' The government chose to charge
under RICO because its goal was to neutralize the criminal organi-S 61
zation in the most effective way possible.
At trial, the government presented evidence that established
pated in the French Place murders, testified about what occurred there in ex-
change for a reduced sentence and recommendation into the witness protection
program. Maro Robbins, Gang Case Jurors Start Deliberating, SAN ANTONIO ExPRESS-
NEWS, Feb. 25, 1999 at 2B; Maro Robbins, Gang Trial Deliberations Expected to Begin
Today, SAN ANTONIO ExPRESS-NEwS, Feb. 24, 1999, at 2B.
57. Maro Robbins, 6-Week Trial In Mafia Case Nearing End, SAN ANTONIO
ExPRESS-NEWS, Feb. 23, 1999, at IA.
58. Interview with Maro Robbins, Staff Writer, San Antonio Express-News
(Mar. 3, 2000) [hereinafter Interview with Robbins] (relating the testimony of
Frank Estrada). Mr. Robbins reports on federal trials in the San Antonio area. Id.
He wrote countless articles about the events that occurred in relation to the Mexi-
can Mafia, the French Place Murders and the testimony of witnesses during the
course of the trial. Id. Mr. Robbins spent many hours listening to testimony of
witnesses in United States v. Robert "Beaver" Perez. Id.
59. Interview with Baumann & Counts, supra note 50. See generally 18 U.S.C. §
6002 (2000) (barring testimony or other information compelled from a federal
witness from being used against that witness in a criminal case, except in certain
circumstances). Initially, it may seem shocking that the government would protect
a known murderer from prosecution in exchange for his testimony. Unfortu-
nately, reality suggests that murderers and racketeers primarily associate with indi-
viduals who themselves are tainted by criminal conduct. As distasteful as this
seems, there is no easy alternative. According to Assistant United States Attorney
Richard Durbin, Chief of the Criminal Division of the United States Attorney's Of-
fice for the Western District of Texas, the government did not "give away a case
against him [Frank Estrada] because we never had one," and it did not have any
evidence against him until he contacted the FBI. Robbins, supra note 53, at IA.
60. Interview with Baumann & Counts, supra note 50.
61. Perez Indictment, supra note 26, passim.
62. Id. at 1.
63. Interview with Baumann & Counts, supra note 50.
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the following events. Herberto "Herb" Huerta (Huerta) was the
President of the Texas Mexican Mafia during the time of the predi-
cate offenses 64 set out within the indictment, and that Robert "Bea-
ver" Perez (Beaver) was one of his generals. 65 Huerta was incarcer-
ated during most of the period of time in which the predicate acts
66were committed. However, he continued to lead the gang, direct-
ing the Mexican Mafia's deadly and violent business from his en-
67closed prison cell. One of those whom he directed was Beaver, a
General in the Mexican Mafia who was in charge of directing and
conducting the affairs of the Mexican Mafia in San Antonio. 6 Bea-
ver ordered numerous members to collect the street tax from per-
sons selling narcotics or committing other street crimes, through
means of extortion and robbery.
69
The government alleged that the Mexican Mafia was responsi-
ble for twenty-two racketeering acts spanning almost a four-year pe-
riod, from 1994 to 1997.70 These racketeering acts included fifteen
murders, three attempted murders, two drug possessions, and one
robbery.71 With the exception of the French Place Murders, the
murders and attempted murders occurred in relation to internal
71conflicts within the Mexican Mafia. Initially, the conflicts cen-
tered on control of the organization. In 1995, one of the members,
Luis Adames (Blue), challenged Huerta for the Presidency. 73 The
emergence of this new leadership deeply divided the ranks of La
eme. A description of the internal struggle was discovered in let-
64. Perez Indictment, supra note 26.
65. Interview with Baumann & Counts, supra note 50.
66. Perez Indictment, supra note 26, at 6; see also Herrick, supra note 20, at B1
(noting that Huerta, a founding member, was convicted in 1994).
67. Perez Indictment, supra note 26, at 6.
68. Id.; Robbins, supra note 21, at 2B (reporting that a gang-member-turned-
government-witness testified that he reported to Mexican Mafia General Robert
"Beaver" Perez).
69. E.g., Herrick, supra note 20, at BI (noting that Perez, a general in the
Mexican Mafia collected the street "tax" and redistributed the money amongst im-
prisoned members).
70. Perez Indictment, supra note 26, at 12-19.
71. Id.
72. E.g., Maro Robbins, Ten Are Found Guilty in Gang Case, Mexican Mafia Boss,
Pals Face Life, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Mar. 4, 1999, at IA [hereinafter Rob-
bins, Ten Face Life]; Maro Robbins, Witness Links Suspect to Slayings, SAN ANTONIO
ExPRESS-NEWS, Feb. 9, 1999, at 2B (noting that Luis "Blue" Adames was found
murdered several months after declaring himself President).
73. Maro Robbins, Group's Letters Read in Court, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS,
Jan. 29, 1999, at 2B.
74. Id.
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ters written between Huerta, Beaver, and other members.7 ' Beaver,
who was loyal to Huerta, faced these struggles within the rank and
76
file of the San Antonio membership. Later, more strife erupted as
the organization attempted to silence members who talked about
the French Place Murders.7 7 Those gang members who lost favor- - 78
with their leader became targets for murder. Under orders from
Beaver, officers and soldiers of the Mexican Mafia assassinated sev-
eral of their own members.79
Tragically, the French Place Murders occurred when several
Mexican Mafia gang members attempted to rob five individuals in
the apartment of one of the victims.8s Something went terribly
wrong leading to the murder of one, and then all.8 ' The victims of
the French Place Murders are believed to have been at the wrong
place at the wrong time. For this mistake of fate, Mexican Mafia
gang members ruthlessly killed the female victim first when she be-
83
came "disrespectful" towards one of the gang members. Her
murder led to the killing of the rest of the victims.8
s
II. THE RACKETEER INFLUENCED AND CORRUPT ORGANIZATION
ACT (RICO)
A. Overview & History Of RICO: The Road To Gang Prosecution
In 1970, Congress enacted the Racketeer Influenced and Cor-
rupt Organizations Act commonly referred to as RICO.8' RICO was
75. Id. (reporting that San Antonio police officer read letters between Mexi-
can Mafia members which revealed the power struggle within the gang).
76. Id.
77. Maro Robbins, Three Plead in Mass Slaying, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEws,
Dec. 19, 1998, at lB.
78. E.g., Maro Robbins, Gang Turncoat Tells of Tight Operation, SAN ANTONIO
ExPRESS-NEWS, Jan. 22, 1999, at 2B; Robbins, supra note 53, at IA.
79. Maro Robbins, Gang Turncoat tells of Tight Operation, SAN ANTONIO ExPREss-
NEWS, Jan. 22, 1999, at 2B.
80. Maro Robbins, Gang Trial Deliberations Expected to Begin Today, SAN
ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Feb. 24, 1999, at IA (reporting that gang members who
testified for the government described the massacre as a "botched robbery").
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Maro Robbins, Member Says Gang Was Tricked, SAN ANTONIO ExPRESS-NEWS,
Jan. 29, 1999, at 2B.
84. Id. (reporting that government informant testified that the four male vic-
tims of the French Place Murders were killed to "leave no witnesses").
85. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 1, 84 Stat.
922 (1970).
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enacted primarily to eliminate "the infiltration of organized crime
and racketeering into legitimate organizations operating in inter-
,,86state commerce. Congress hoped that RICO would substantially
reduce the infiltration of organized crime and racketeering into le-
gitimate businesses by criminalizing certain activities performed by
individuals in relation to legitimate or illegitimate organizations. s
With the enactment of RICO, Congress significantly strength-
ened the government's ability to prosecute members of organized
crime.8 It constructed the RICO statute in a way that gave federal
prosecutors the power to prosecute criminals who had previously
been "untouchable" because of their insulation within their respec-
tive organizations." In part, Congress extended the federal gov-
ernment's authority to prosecute these criminals by including a
provision within the RICO statute, which required that a liberal in-
terpretation of the statute be adopted. 90 Subsequently, courts have
been able to extend RICO to numerous types of organizations, in-
cluding gangs.91
Following the congressional mandate of liberal interpretation,
the Supreme Court has interpreted RICO in a way that makes
prosecution of gangs under RICO possible. In United States v.
Turkette, 2 the Court held that the organization affected by or asso-
ciated with criminal activity could be either a legal or illegal entity.93
86. S. REP. No. 91-617, at 80 (1969).
87. Id.
88. Congress stated that the purpose of RICO is "[t]o seek the eradication of
organized crime in the United States by strengthening the legal tools in the evi-
dence-gathering process, by establishing new penal prohibitions, and by providing
enhanced sanctions and new remedies to deal with the unlawful activities of those
engaged in organized crime." Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No.
91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 923 (1970).
89. Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 19 (1983) (showing that the defen-
dant was significantly insulated from the predicate acts of the "association in fact"
enterprise formed to commit arson and defraud insurance companies).
90. 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (2000) (quoting Pub. L. § 91-453 which provides that
"(a) the provisions of this title [enacting this chapter and amending sections 1505,
2516, and 2517 of this title] shall be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial
purpose").
91. 10 Mexican Mafia Members Receive Life Sentences, SAN ANTONIO ExPREsS-
NEWS, Sept. 7, 1997, at 7B (reporting that ten Mexican Mafia gang members were
sentenced to life imprisonment for RICO violations in Los Angeles, CA); Prosecu-
tors Seek Ways To Continue Crackdown on Mexican Mafia Gang, SAN ANTONIO ExPRESS-
NEWS, Sept. 22, 1997, at 15A (reviewing the recent RICO prosecution of nineteen
gang members in Los Angeles, CA.).
92. 452 U.S. 576 (1981).
93. Id at 585.
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The Court determined that the application of the RICO statute was
not limited to situations where illegal activity has infiltrated legiti-
mate business operations.9 Instead, the Court found that RICO
could be applied in situations where the organization in question
95was purely criminal in nature.
Furthering the expanse of RICO, the Supreme Court in Na-
tional Organization for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler,96 resolved a split
among the circuits when it determined that an organization did
not have to have an economic motive to fall under the reach of the
RICO statute.97 Therefore, the goal of the organization does not
have to be one of economic gain. RICO can be applied to organi-
zations that have primarily political or ideological goals as well.
Critics have asserted that the RICO statute should only be ap-
plied to traditional forms of organized crime such as "The Mafia."98
These critics emphasize that Congress enacted RICO to destroy the99 100
"Mafia. " 99 Definitely, Congress had such an agenda, but numer-
ous factors indicate that RICO's expansion beyond traditional or-
ganized crime entities has been appropriate and was intended. For
one, the Supreme Court has noted that in spite of "It]he fact that
RICO has been applied in situations not expressly anticipated by
Congress does not demonstrate ambiguity. It demonstrates
breadth."' 0' The Court has observed that some of the expansion of
RICO may be due to the "breadth of the predicate offenses" which
includes wire, mail and securities fraud.'07 In addition, the Organ-
ized Crime Control Act of 1970 in which RICO was promulgated
does not indicate that Congress intended to limit the application of
RICO to organized crime.'° In contrast, Congress expressly limited
the application of other statutes enacted within the same period, to
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. 510 U.S. 249 (1994).
97. Id. at 262 (determining that "RICO contains no economic motive re-
quirement").
98. H.J. Inc. v. N.W. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 246 (1989).
99. Id. at 247 (quoting sponsor of RICO statute who is responding to criticism
of RICO not being limited to organized crime).
100. United States v. Russello, 464 U.S. 16, 26 (1983) (noting that organized
crime families were a major target of Congress in enacting RICO).
101. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 499 (1985) (quoting Harco,
Inc. v. Am. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 747 F.2d 384, 398 (1994).
102. H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 236.
103. Id. at 244.
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traditional organized crime. 104 Furthermore, congressional spon-
sors of the RICO statute indicated that in RICO, "'organized crime'
was simply a shorthand method of referring to a large and varying
group of individual criminal offenses committed in diverse circum-
stances, not a precise concept."0 5 For example, the crimes commit-
ted by members of the Mexican Mafia are a group of distinct of-
fenses committed by an organized criminal group. In essence,
the crimes are committed to promote and further the criminal or-. • 107
ganization.
The RICO statute criminalizes four types of activities. Three of
these violations are referred to as "substantive RICO offenses."08 A
"person "l°9 can commit a substantive RICO offense in three differ-
ent ways: (1) by investing income derived from a pattern of racket-
eering activity or collecting an unlawful debt to obtain an interest
in an enterprise affecting interstate or foreign commerce; (2) by
obtaining or maintaining through a pattern of racketeering activity
or through collection of an unlawful debt "any interest in or con-
trol of' an enterprise affecting interstate or foreign commerce;"'
or, (3) working for or associating with an enterprise which affects
interstate or foreign commerce through a pattern of racketeering
activity or through the collection of an illegal debt to manage or
conduct the affairs of such an enterprise.11 2 The fourth type of vio-
lation under RICO is conspiracy to commit a substantive RICO of-
fense. Thus, a person is in violation of the RICO statute when he
conspires to commit a substantive RICO offense. 113
104. In the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Street Act of 1968, Congress lim-
ited the statute to organized crime which it defined as "the unlawful activities of
the members of a highly organized, disciplined association engaged in supplying
illegal goods and services, including but not limited to gambling, prostitution,
loan sharking, narcotics, labor racketeering, and other unlawful activities of mem-
bers of such organizations." Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Street Act of 1968,
§ 601 (b), Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 209.
105. H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 237 (quoting congressional sponsors of RICO).
106. MAFIA CONSTITUTION, supra note 21. The "Constitution" of the Mexican
Mafia recognizes the commission of individual crimes by its members on behalf of
the gang. Id.
107. Id.
108. Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52 (1997) (referring to violations of 18
U.S.C. § 1962(a), (b), and (c) as substantive RICO offenses).
109. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(3)(2000) (defining the term "person" to include "any
individual or entity capable of holding a legal or beneficial interest in property").
110. Id. § 1962(a).
111. Id.§1962(b).
112. Id. § 1962(c).
113. Id. §1962(d).
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For any violation of the RICO statute, a person may be sub-
jected to criminal or civil penalties including forfeiture of any in-
terest or property acquired or maintained in violation of RICO."
4
The criminal penalties for committing a violation under RICO are
formidable. A person who is convicted of a RICO violation may be
imprisoned for up to twenty years or up to life imprisonment if the
maximum penalty for the racketeering act is life imprisonment."'
The convicted defendant will usually be directed to forfeit any in-
terests acquired or maintained in violation of the RICO statute, and
any property acquired from a RICO violation." 6  In addition,
Courts are given power to prevent or restrain RICO violations by
requiring divestiture of any interest in an enterprise or by the im-
position of restrictions on the future activities of a person involved
in RICO violations."7 A person may receive a punishment for a
substantive RICO offense that exceeds the punishment for the un-
derlying offenses."1 Furthermore, a court may authorize an order
preventing the transfer of forfeitable property prior to convic-
tion.119
All ten defendants in Perez were found guilty and sentenced to
life imprisonment without parole.'20  The term of imprisonment
was statutorily required because the underlying criminal offenses of
the Mexican Mafia were murders."' Although feared by residents,
this deadly gang had little forfeitable property. When its leader,
Beaver, was arrested only $30,000 was confiscated from his home in.... 122
a subsidized housing neighborhood.
Like other statutes, RICO provides civil remedy for injuries
sustained as a result of a substantive RICO violation, effectively su-
perimposing the civil realm of law atop the criminal realm."' Con-
114. Id. § 1963(a).
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. § 1963 (describing applicable criminal penalties for engaging in rack-
eteering activity).
119. Id. § 1963(d)(1).
120. Robbins, Ten Face Life, supra note 72, at IA.
121. Interview with Baumann & Counts, supra note 50; 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)
(setting statutory sentencing requirements).
122. Herrick, supra note 20, at BI.
123. For example, the Clayton Act, after which the RICO statute was modeled,
includes civil penalties. 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1994).
124. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2000) (declaring that a person may sue for injury sus-
tained as a result of a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962). If the plaintiff is successful in
this suit, she may recover triple damages and any cost associated with bringing suit
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gress created RICO with both civil and criminal sanctions because
it recognized that the government did not have the resources to
identify and pursue every matter arising from a RICO violation.
125
Thus, the civil RICO provision allows private persons to sue when a
RICO violation is the proximate cause of an injury to their business
126or property.
The United States Supreme Court has addressed numerous
complex issues, which arose from disputes over interpretive differ-
ences of the RICO statute in both the civil and criminal contexts.
1
2
7
including reasonable attorney fees from the defendant. Id. In order to assert a
claim under the civil RICO provisions for an injury caused by a RICO violation,
the plaintiff must assert a substantive RICO offense in her pleading. Id. A crimi-
nal conviction, however, is not necessary to initiate the cause of action. S.P.R.L. v.
Imrex Co., Inc., 473 U.S. 479, 491 (1985); Poling v. Morgan, 598 F. Supp. 686, 690
(D. Ariz. 1984); Glusband v. Benjamin, 530 F. Supp. 240, 241 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
Most courts have found that a plaintiff, to be compensated for an injury under 18
U.S.C. § 1962(a), must assert an injury that resulted from the defendant's invest-
ment of racketeering income. E.g., Parker & Parsley Petroleum Co. v. Dresser In-
dus., 972 F.2d 580, 584 (5th Cir. 1992); Danielsen v. Burnside-Ott Aviation Train-
ing Ctr., Inc., 941 F.2d 1220, 1229-30 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Ouaknine v. McFarlane,
897 F.2d 75, 82-83 (2d Cir. 1990); Craighead v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 899 F.2d 485,
494 (6th Cir. 1990); Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331, 356-58 (3d Cir. 1989). Today,
claims asserted under the RICO statute are applied to a broad range of conduct
often occurring over an extended period of time and involving a large number of
people and entities. Frederick B. Lacey, Civil RICO Update, SE28 ALI-ABA 547
(Aug. 26, 1999) (discussing the expanding use of RICO and its extensive impact
on numerous individuals and entities). The pleading which asserts a civil RICO
violation is usually long and complex because most RICO complaints allege predi-
cate offenses which must be pleaded with particularity. FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
125. Paul B. O'Neill, "Mother of Mercy, Is This the Beginning of RICO?": The Proper
Point of Accrual of a Private Civil RICO Action, 65 N.Y.U. L. REv. 172, 180-82 (1990).
126. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2000); Sedima, 473 U.S. at 497 (noting that the
"compensable injury necessarily is the harm caused by [the] predicate acts" of a
RICO violation). Another civil RICO provision provides that a defendant who has
been convicted of crimes as a part of the criminal RICO statute is estopped from
denying the underlying criminal offenses on which the subsequent civil suit is
based if the suit is brought by the United States government. 18 U.S.C §
1964(d) (2000). Most civil suits are brought for violations of 18 U.S.C § 1964(c).
G. Robert Blakey & Scott D. Cessar, Equitable Relief Under Civil RICO: Reflections on
Religious Technology Center v. Wollerheim: Will Civil RICO be Effective Only Against
White-Collar Crime?, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 526, 619 (1987) (noting that in 1985
and 1986 about 92.5% of civil RICO claims cite to 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c)).
127. E.g., Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52 (1997); Klehr v. A.O. Smith
Corp., 521 U.S. 179 (1997); Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249
(1994); Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544 (1993); Reves v. Ernst & Young,
507 U.S. 170 (1993); Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258 (1992); Taf-
flin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455 (1990); H.J. Inc. v. N.W. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229
(1989); Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., 483 U.S. 143 (1987);
Shearson/Am. Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987); Sedima, 473 U.S. at
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Few of these issues were addressed until private citizens began to
utilize the civil RICO provision as a claim for relief. 1' For years af-
ter its enactment, the civil RICO provision had little effect on or-
ganized crime or racketeering within organizations because few
civil suits were filed.' 29 Finally, in the late 1980's, the number of• . 130
suits filed under civil RICO grew astronomically. With this in-
crease, courts found themselves trying to resolve numerous ambi-
guities in the statute."' The Supreme Court has attempted to re-
solve most of these ambiguities by liberally construing the RICO
statute, as it believes Congress intended.
32
Although the Court has addressed numerous issues related to
the substantive RICO violations, it has only addressed one regard-. 13314
ing RICO conspiracy. In Salinas v. United States, 1 4 the Court once
again resolved a split among the circuits when it determined that a
RICO conspiracy charge did not require proof of the commission
of an overt act "to effect the object of the conspiracy" as required
135by the general federal conspiracy statute. Here, the Court noted
that RICO conspiracy was intended to be more "comprehensive".. . 136
than traditional conspiracy statutes. The Court was sharply criti-cized for this holding.3 1 Irrespective of this criticism, the Salinas
499-50 (holding that RICO was not limited to organized crime; it also was applica-
ble to legitimate businesses); Am. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Haroco, Inc., 473 U.S.
606 (1985).
128. Although this paper focuses on RICO in a criminal context, some discus-
sion of legal developments which arose in the civil context is necessary because
these legal developments are applicable to RICO in the criminal context as well.
E.g., Scheidler, 510 U.S. at 249; Alexander, 509 U.S. at 544; Reves, 507 U.S. at 170; H.J.
Inc., 492 U.S. at 229; Malley-Duff 483 U.S. at 143; Shearson/Am. Express, 482 U.S. at
220; Sedima, 473 U.S. at 499-50.
129. Douglas E. Abrams, Crime Legislation and the Public Interest: Lessons from
Civil RICO, 50 SMU L. REV. 33, 51 (1996) (noting that few civil claims were as-
serted).
130. Robert E. Wood, Civil RICO-Limitations in Limbo, 21 WILLAMETTE L. REv.
683, 684 (1985); William H. Reinquist, Get RICO Out of My Courtroom, WALL ST.J.,
May 19, 1989, at Al4.
131. Abrams, supra note 129, at 51.
132. E.g., Reves, 507 U.S. at 183 (recognizing that it is utilizing Congress' intent
to broadly interpret RICO provisions); H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 248-49 (indicating that
it would not apply a narrow construction to the pattern element of a RICO viola-
tion because it would be contrary to congressional intent).
133. Jeremy M. Miller, RICO And Conspiracy Construction: The Mischief of The Eco-
nomic Model, 104 CoM. L.J. 26, 63 n.16 (1999).
134. 522 U.S. 52, 63 (1997).
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. E.g., Miller, supra note 133, at 63 n.16; Barry Tarlow, RICO Report, at
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decision regarding the RICO conspiracy provision allows the gov-
ernment to indict an individual without having to prove that the
RICO conspiracy defendant or his coconspirators committed any
act in furtherance of the conspiracy. 11
B. The Heart Of RICO Conspiracy: Elements Of A Substantive RICO
Offense
Most defendants including gang members, are charged with
violating section 1962(c) of the RICO statute which makes it a
crime for "any person employed by or associated with any enter-
prise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or for-
eign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly in
the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of rack-
eteering activity or collection of unlawful debt."'39 In order to ob-
tain a conviction under this section of the RICO statute, the gov-
ernment must prove the existence of the enterprise in question,
the pattern of racketeering activity, the effect on interstate or for-
eign commerce, and the conduct of the defendant in relation to
the enterprise.1
4
0
The Enterprise
An "enterprise" is statutorily defined to include "[a] ny individ-
ual, partnership, corporation, association or other legal entity and
any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a
legal entity."1  Interpreting this statute, the Supreme Court de-
fined an enterprise as a "group of persons associated together for a
common purpose of engaging in a common course of conduct."'
42
This broad interpretation has allowed lower courts to recognize a
number of entities as enterprises, which are not enumerated in the
143statute.
http://www.criminaljustice.org/CHAMPION/ARTICLES/98apr05.htm (last vis-
ited Mar. 13, 2001).
138. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c)(2000).
139. Blakey & Cesar, supra note 126, at 619 (noting that in 1985 and 1986
about 92.5% of civil RICO claims cite to 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c)).
140. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c).
141. Id. § 1961(4).
142. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583 (1981).
143. E.g., United States v. Vaccaro, 115 F.3d 1211, 1220 (5th Cir. 1997) (cheat-
ing scheme in a casino); United States v. London, 66 F.3d 1227, 1244 (5th Cir.
1995) (involving sole proprietorship); United States v. Blinder, 10 F.3d 1468, 1473
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An "association in fact" enterprise is an "an ongoing organiza-
tion, formal or informal," where its associates function as a "con-
tinuing unit" to achieve shared illegal objectives. 4  Moreover, this
form of enterprise must have "an existence beyond that which is
necessary merely to commit each of the acts charged as predicate
racketeering offenses., 4 1 In an "association in fact" enterprise, it is
not necessary that the membership and activities remain the same
throughout the lifetime of the enterprise.14 6 Brief interruptions of
the enterprise's illegal activities do not per se defeat the existence
of a single enterprise."'
Often, it seems easier to prove the existence of an "association
in fact" enterprise by what it does rather than through an analysis• 148
of its structure. Still, an "association in fact" enterprise must149 • 150
function as a unit. 14 It cannot merely function on an ad hoc basis.
It must have an ascertainable structure distinguishable from a tem-
porary structure, which arises in the course of racketeering. 51 In
determining whether or not the targeted association is an "associa-
tion in fact" enterprise, it is essential to determine if "the enterprise
would still exist were the predicate acts removed from the equa-
tion.' 5 1 Most courts agree that all enterprises must exhibit three
characteristics: "1) a common or shared purpose; 2) some continu-
ity of structure and personnel; and 3) an ascertainable structure
distinct from that inherent in a pattern of racketeering." 53
A gang is defined as "a number of people associated together
in some way."1 54 Consistent with this definition, gangs are consid-
(9th Cir. 1993) (finding that a group of legal entities such as corporations, may
constitute an "association in fact").
144. Turkette, 452 U.S. at 583.
145. United States v. Riccobene, 709 F.2d 214, 224 (3d Cir. 1983).
146. United States v. Console, 13 F.3d 641, 650-53 (3d Cir. 1993).
147. Id.
148. United States v. Coonan, 938 F.2d 1553, 1559 (2d Cir. 1991) (quoting
United States v. Bagaric, 706 F.2d 42, 56 (2d Cir. 1983)).
149. First Nationwide Bank v. Gelt Funding Corp., 27 F.3d 763 (2d Cir. 1994).
150. Handeen v. Lemaire, 112 F.3d 1339, 1351 (8th Cir. 1997).
151. Stephens, Inc. v. Geldermann, Inc., 962 F.2d 808, 815 (8th Cir. 1992)
(stating that the enterprise cannot simply be "the minimal associations which sur-
rounds the [pattern racketeering] acts." (quoting United States v. Bledsoe, 674
F.2d 647, 664 (8th Cir. 1982)). Although the enterprise and the pattern of racket-
eering are separate elements of a RICO violation, the government need not ad-
duce different proof for each element. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576,
583 (1981). The same proof may be used to establish both elements. Id.
152. Handeen, 112 F.3d at 1352.
153. Id. at 1351.
154. WEBSTER's NEw TWENTIETH CENTURY DICTIONARY 752 (2d ed. 1983).
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ered "association in fact" enterprises. 55 The Mexican Mafia does
manifest the elements of an "association in fact" enterprise. It has
an identified group purpose expressed in its "Constitution," which
is "the advancement of criminal practices for the benefit of and ad-
vancement of Mexikanemi." ,6 The gang's structure is distinguish-
able from the pattern of racketeering in that it has designated
permanent positions.15 The Mexican Mafia continues to exist re-
gardless of whether or not its members are free to commit crimes
on the street of San Antonio or are imprisoned in Texas' correc-
tional facilities.
58
The Conduct Of The Defendant
In Reves v. Ernst & Young,159 the Supreme Court addressed the
meaning of "to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the
conduct of such enterprise's affairs."' The Court developed the
Reves "operation and management" test to assess the individual de-
fendant's conduct in relation to the enterprise. The Court held
that a violation under 18 U.S.C § 1962(c) of the RICO statute could
only be found against those "who participated in the operation or
management of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering ac-
tivity. " However, the court rejected the petitioner's assertion that
only those in the upper rungs of the organization should fall under• 162 ,
the purview of RICO. Instead, the Court found that "any person
employed by or associated with [an] enterprise," even those indi-
viduals with low-level positions may be found in violation of the
RICO statute because low level participants, although following the
directions of superiors, "operate" the enterprise as well.' 63
155. United States v. Andrews, 754 F. Supp. 1161, 1165 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (indi-
cating that the RICO enterprise was a street gang called the "El Rukns"); Perez In-
dictment, supra note 26, at 2 (describing the Mexican Mafia as an "association in
fact" enterprise as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4)); U.S. Department of Justice,
Criminal Division, Organized Crime & Racketeering Section, Douglas E. Crow &
Miriam Banks, Racketeering Statutes In Gang Prosecutions 1, 1 (Apr. 22, 1998) (sug-
gesting that gangs should be defined as "association in fact" enterprises).
156. MAFIA CONSTrrUTION, supra note 21.
157. Id.
158. Robbins, supra note 22, at lB.
159. 507 U.S. 170 (1993).
160. Id. at 177.
161. Id. at 184.
162. Id.
163. Id.
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Furthermore, an individual may be associated with an enter-
prise even though he holds no official position and has no formal
connection with it.164 Thus, being associated with an enterprise
may be effected by means of an informal or loose relationship.1
65
Finally, when a person's actions are remote to the activity of the en-
terprise, or his role in the enterprise is minor, he will still be associ-
ated with the enterprise within the meaning of the statute, if he
knowingl y participated in an illegal racketeering activity of the en-
terprise.
Individuals who are considered "associated with" the Mexican
Mafia span the entire range of possible levels of participation. This
gang has a distinct hierarchy, where its leaders are given named po-
sitions. 167 These leaders directly manage and operate the affairs of
the gang while their subordinates "oerate" the enterprise by carry-
ing out the orders of its leadership.
The Pattern Of Racketeering Activity
Generally, a "pattern of racketeering activity" exists when two.... 169
or more racketeering activities have occurred. One of these
predicate offenses must have occurred within five years prior to the
return of the indictment and the other must have occurred no
more than ten years earlier.170 The alleged racketeering activity
must be chargeable or indictable for the substantive RICO charge
to be available.' It is important to note that sometimes proof of
more than two predicate acts may be required. 11 In Perez, the gov-
164. Id. (determining that a person may operate or manage an enterprise
though only associated with it through exerted control).
165. Id. at 184-86.
166. Id. at 185.
167. MAFIA CONSTITUTION, supra note 21.
168. Id.; Robbins, Gang Turncoat, supra note 21, at 2B (relating story told by
Mexican Mafia member who reports collecting extortion money from drug deal-
ers).
169. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (2000).
170. Id.
171. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(A)-(E)(2000). The federal government cannot
commit acts that are "chargeable" or "indictable." Therefore, the federal govern-
ment cannot violate § 1962, and cannot be found liable under § 1964(c). See Ber-
ger v. Pierce, 933 F.2d 393, 397 (6th Cir. 1991); McNeily v. United States, 6 F.3d
343, 350 (5th Cir. 1993).
172. E.g., H.J. Inc. v. N.W. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 230 (1989) (finding that
two predicate acts may not be sufficient to establish a RICO violation); Bacchus
Indus. v. Arvin Indus., 939 F.2d 887, 891 (10th Cir. 1991) (determining that prov-
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ernment alleged the commission of twenty-two predicate offenses
spanning almost a four-year period from 1994 to 1997. 73 These
racketeering acts included fifteen murders, three attempted mur-
ders, two drug possessions, and one robbery.
74
Predicate acts which constitute "racketeering activity" have
been statutorily defined to include a number of crimes such as
murder, kidnapping, gambling, arson, robbery, extortion, money
laundering, wire and mail fraud and to a lesser extent obstruction
of justice and witness intimidation. 7 1 Certain state crimes punish-
able by more than one year of imprisonment are also considered
racketeering activities.176  Since RICO's enactment, Congress has
expanded the list of predicate offenses on two occasions. The
Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984177 included the dealing
in obscene material and the non-reporting of currency and foreignS 178
transactions. More recently, in the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996,179 Congress added a number of immi-
gration crimes to the list of racketeering activities, which can be
considered RICO predicate offenses. 80 Despite these changes, the
predicate offenses for most RICO cases remain wire and mail
fraud.1
8 1
ing two predicate acts does not establish a pattern of racketeering per se). The
Department of Justice will not approve a prosecution under RICO where the
predicate acts are considered to have arisen from a single criminal episode. H.J.
Inc., 492 U.S. at 231, 237.
173. Perez Indictment, supra note 26, at 12-19.
174. Id.
175. 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1).
176. Id. § 1961(1)(A); see also United States v. Polanco, 145 F.3d 536 (2d Cir.
1988) (holding that murder was a state crime that may serve as a RICO predicate
offense); Ideal Dairy Farms, Inc. v.John Labatt, Ltd., 90 F.3d 737, 746-47 (3d Cir.
1996) (rejecting federal and state RICO claims because the petitioner failed to
prove the elements for an offense under the state fraud statute).
177. Pub. L. No. 98-473, §§ 901, 1020, 98 Star. 1837, 2135, 2143 (codified in
scattered sections of Titles 18 and 31, U.S.C.).
178. Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 1020(1)-(2) (1984) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1961
(1)(A)-(B)); See, e.g., Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana, 489 U.S. 46, 57 (1989)
(applying state RICO statute to selling of obscene video tapes at retail video store).
179. Pub. L. No. 104-132, Title IV § 433, 100 Star. 1214, 1274 (1996) (amend-
ing 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)).
180. H.R. REP. No. 104-22, at 9 (1995); 141 CONG. REc. H1588 (daily ed. Feb.
10, 1995) (stating that immigration crimes were added to the list of RICO predi-
cate offenses because "[o]rganized crime rings in this country, with ties to others
abroad, have developed to prey upon illegal immigrants who want to come to the
United States").
181. Klehr v. A.O. Smith Corp., 521 U.S. 179, 191 (1997) (noting that, as of
1985, ninety percent of all civil RICO cases arose from mail, wire or securities
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In addition to proving the predicate offenses, the government
must show that the racketeering acts are related and that there is
continuity of criminal activity in order to ascertain a "pattern" of
racketeering activity. Proof of relatedness does not re quire that
the racketeering acts be directly related to each other.8 Rather,
the relatedness requirement is satisfied where the racketeering acts
are related to the same enterprise in some way. 84 In other words,
the predicate acts benefited or furthered the goals of the enter-
prise; were the means by which the defendant participated in the
affairs of the enterprise, or the defendant's participation in the en-
terprise in some way facilitated the commission of the racketeering
acts.
In H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 1 5 the Court held
that continuity could be established in a variety of ways. s6 The gov-
ernment can prove that a series of related predicate acts extends
over a substantial period of time; or that the predicate acts invoke a
distinct threat of long-term racketeering activity. If the government
moves to prove the existence of a distinct threat of long-term rack-
eteering activity, it may show that the threat was implicit or explicit;
or that the predicate acts are attributable to a defendant operating
as part of a long term association that exists for criminal pur-
187poses.
In Sedima, S.P.t.L. v. Imrex Co. Inc., the Supreme Court at-
tempted to address what constitutes a "pattern of activity." 8 8 Sim-
fraud).
182. E.g., H.J. Inc. v. N.W. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U. S. 229, 240-42 (1989) (noting
that while two predicate acts are necessary to form a RICO pattern they may not be
sufficient unless they are both related and amount to or pose a threat of contin-
ued criminal activity); Tel-Phonic Serv., Inc. v. TBS Int'l, Inc., 975 F.2d 1134, 1140
(5th Cir. 1992) (holding that the minimum requisite number of predicates is not
sufficient to establish a RICO pattern). The racketeering predicates "must be re-
lated and amount to or pose a threat of continued criminal activity." Id. (citing
H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 236-39).
183. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576 (1981) (stating the focus of RICO
is the enterprise, the predicate acts must be related to the enterprise and not each
other). Consistent with this principle, lower courts have upheld the convictions of
defendants where predicates were unrelated to each other. E.g., United States v.
DeLuca, 137 F.3d 24, 36-37 (1st Cir. 1998); United States v. Castro, 89 F.3d 1443,
1450-51 (11th Cir. 1996); United States v. Darden, 70 F.3d 1507, 1526-27 (8th Cir.
1995); United States v. DiNome, 954 F.2d 839, 843-44 (2d Cir. 1992).
184. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576 (1981).
185. 492 U.S. 229 (1989).
186. Id. at 230.
187. Id.
188. 473 U.S. 479, 496 n.14 (1985).
[Vol. 27:42318
24
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 4 [2001], Art. 11
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol27/iss4/11
DISMANTLING THE MEXICAN MAFIA
ply, showing that a member of the enterprise committed an iso-• 189
lated crime will not be sufficient. Referring to the Senate's origi-
nal report on the proposed RICO statute, the Court determined
that a pattern consists of "continuity plus relationship." 90 Here, the
Court embraced the definition of "pattern" found in 18 U.S.C. §
3575(e) which states that "criminal conduct forms a pattern if it
embraces criminal acts that have the same or similar purposes, re-
sults, participants, victims, or methods of commission, or are oth-
erwise interrelated by distinguishing characteristics."19'
The Effect On Commerce
Proving the effect on interstate or foreign commerce is ajuris-
dictional element essential to winning the conviction. However,
courts have uniformly held that only a de minimis effect on inter-
state commerce is required.9 In fact, the government is not re-
quired to prove that the individual defendant had knowledge of
the requisite effect on commerce. 93 It is sufficient to prove that the
189. Id. (noting that RICO was designed to combat organized crime, not iso-
lated offenses).
190. Id.
191. Formerly 18 U.S.C. § 3575(e)(1982) (covering increased sentences for
dangerous special offenders), repealed by Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-473, §§ 212(a)(1)-(2), 98 Stat. 1837, 1987. Adopting the Sedima Court's
analysis, several circuits have developed a way to assess the existence of a pattern
through application of some form of what is sometimes referred to as the Sedima
"continuity plus relationship" test. E.g., United States v. Palumbo Bros., Inc., 145
F.3d 850, 877 (7th Cir. 1998) (noting that the racketeering activity must be related
and the acts establish continued criminal activity); Diamonds Plus, Inc. v. Kolber,
•960 F.2d 765, 769 (8th Cir. 1992) (determining that the test for relationship is
whether "acts are similar in method, purpose and result," and that one test for
continuity is existence of "threat of causing continuous harm in future"); United
States v. Freeman, 6 F.3d 586, 596 (9th Cir. 1993) (interpreting Sedima broadly,
and stating that two predicate acts arising from a single scheme of bribery commit-
ted to improve the introduction of special interest litigation constituted a pattern);
Resolution Trust Corp. v. Stone, 998 F.2d 1534, 1543-44 (10th Cir. 1993) (declar-
ing that factors to be considered when assessing if a pattern exists include: (1)
number of victims; (2) number of racketeering acts; (3) variety of racketeering
acts; (4) whether injuries caused were distinct; (5) complexity and size of scheme;
and (6) nature or character of enterprise or unlawful activity).
192. E.g., United States v. Doherty, 867 F.2d 47 (1st Cir. 1989); United States v.
Norton, 867 F.2d 1354 (11th Cir. 1989); United States v. Muskovsky, 863 F.2d 1319
(7th Cir. 1988).
193. U.S. Department of Justice, Criminal Division, Organized Crime & Rack-
eteering Section, Douglas E. Crow & Miriam Banks, Racketeering Statutes In Gang
Prosecutions 1, 3 (Apr. 22, 1998) (suggesting that gangs should be defined as "asso-
ciation in fact" enterprises).
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enterprise as a whole affected commerce. 194 When a criminal en-
terprise is the target of the RICO case, the prosecutor can show the
effect on interstate or foreign commerce by proving one of the fol-
lowing: (1) the enterprise purchased, sold or distributed contra-
band, in interstate commerce; (2) the enterprise used interstate fa-
cilities (interstate banking system, telephone calls, wire transfers);
(3) members or associates of the enterprise traveled in interstate
commerce, or outside the United States, to carry out their illegal
activities; or (4) the victims, such as storefronts, of the enterprise's
illegal activities were involved in interstate commerce.195
C. RICO Conspiracy
"The primary focus of the crime of conspiracy is the
agreement itself, the collusion, the secrecy and the result-
ing threat to society that such criminal liaisons create."
196
In addition to being prosecuted for committing a substantive
RICO offense, a person may also be prosecuted under the RICO197
statute for conspiring to commit a substantive RICO offense.
Generally, the crime of conspiracy involves conspiring to complete
a substantive criminal offense. To secure a conviction for con-
spiracy, the government is required to prove the existence of an
agreement to complete an illegal goal. Moreover, the govern-
ment must prove that the defendant had knowledge of the con-
spiratorial agreement and voluntarily participated in it.200 Along
with the RICO statute there are numerous federal statutory provi-
sions which proscribe conspiracy as a distinct crime.2"' Most of
these crimes require the government to prove that one of the con-
spirators committed an overt act to further the objective of the
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. State v. Verive, 627 P.2d 721, 732 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981).
197. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (2000).
198. KAPLAN, CRIMINAL LAW: MATERIAL AND CASES 919 (3rd ed. 1983). Conspir-
acy is an inchoate crime. Id. at 923. Although similar to attempt, it is different in
that it requires two participants but requires less conduct than attempt because it
is more of a preparatory crime than attempt. Id.
199. Todd R. Russell & 0. Carter Snead, Federal Criminal Conspiracy, 35 AM.
CRIM. L. REv. 739, 745 (1998).
200. Id. at 747.
201. E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000); 18 U.S.C. §§ 224, 286, 351(d), 371, 372, 7 94(c),
1201(c), 2384 (2000); 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 963 (2000).
202. Russell & Snead, supra note 199, at 750. An overt act need only be an act
2320 [Vol. 27:4
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conspiracy.2 3 Unlike these other federal conspiracy crimes, the
RICO conspiracy provision does not require the completion of an
overt act. Although many bemoan the lack of an overt require-. • 205 ..
ment in RICO conspiracy, this concern seems misplaced in light
of the insignificance of an overt act. Such an act need only indicate
that the conspiracy has gone beyond a mere meeting of the
206minds Thus, an overt act need not be illegal or an offense
201
charged in the indictment. 20
It was in Salinas v. United States 8 where the Supreme Court
held that a defendant could be convicted for violating the RICO
conspiracy provision without the commission of an overt act.0 The
Court noted that "[t]he RICO conspiracy statute broadened con-
spiracy coverage by omitting the requirement of an overt act, it did
not, at the same time, work the radical change of requiring the
Government to prove each conspirator agreed that he would be the• . ,,210
one to commit two predicate acts. Taking a stance in favor of
the prosecution, the Court opined that if the government was re-
quired to prove that every conspirator committed an overt act, most
RICO conspiracy prosecutions would become "nugatory.
21 1
The Court emphasized that the defendant need not personally
commit or agree to commit two predicate acts (two acts of racket-
that indicates the conspiracy has moved beyond "a mere meeting of the minds."
State v. Celaya, 556 P.2d 1167, 1172 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1976).
203. 18 U.S.C § 371 (defining an overt act as an "act to effect the object of the
conspiracy").
204. Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 62 (1997). In the civil realm, this is
not the case. A plaintiff who seeks a civil remedy for injury to her business or
property, which was caused by a violation of the RICO conspiracy provision must
prove the existence of a conspiracy and the commission of an overt act in further-
ance of the conspiracy that proximately caused the injury. Bowman v. W. Auto
Supply Co., 985 F.2d 383, 387-88 (8th Cir. 1993). On November 3, 1999, the Su-
preme Court heard oral arguments to determine whether a plaintiff who brings a
civil RICO conspiracy claim must prove that the overt act that caused the injury
was an act in furtherance of the conspiracy or that not only did the overt act
proximately cause the injury in furtherance of the conspiracy, but it was also a
racketeering act. See Beck v. Prupis, 162 F.3d 1090 (11th Cir. 1998), cert. granted,
119 S.Ct. 2046 (1999).
205. Miller, supra note 133, at 58-63.
206. Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 334 (1957).
207. United States v. Hurley, 957 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1992) (determining that
even legal conduct may be considered an overt act).
208. 522 U.S. 52 (1997).
209. Id. at 62.
210. Id.
211. Id. (quoting Bannon v. United States, 156 U.S. 464, 469 (1895)).
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eering) to be found guilty of RICO conspiracy.2"2 The government
is only required to prove that two or more people agreed to com-
mit a substantive RICO offense and that the defendant knew of and
agreed to the overall objective of the RICO conspiracy.21 3 The
overall objective of the RICO conspiracy must be to commit a sub-
214stantive RICO offense.
The RICO conspiracy provision is a more comprehensive form
of conspiracy than the general conspiracy offense.2 5 It is consid-
ered a weapon in the prosecution's arsenal that enhances the reach
of the government in its fight against "organized" crime.216 RICO
conspiracy allows the government to prosecute multiple unrelated
crimes and conspiracies in a single prosecution as long as the goal
of the conspiracies is to commit a substantive RICO offense.17
Thus, the government may "rim the wheel"218 of conspirator situa-
tions where the only common denominator between co-
219conspirators may be one co-conspirator. In such circumstances,
the government may charge numerous defendants with a single
conspiracy even though the predicate crimes seem totally unre-220
lated. Such single prosecutions are approved because the co-
212. Id. at 65.
213. Id.; United States v. Posada-Rios, 158 F.3d 832, 857 (5th Cir. 1998);
United States v. Marmolejo, 89 F.3d 1185, 1196-97 (5th Cir. 1996).
214. Salinas, 522 U.S. at 62.
215. Id.
216. Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 26 (1983) (noting that RICO was
"intended to provide new weapons of unprecedented scope" in order to eradicate
organized crime).
217. This is based on the fact that the focus of RICO is the enterprise. In
United States v. Turkette, the Supreme Court determined that an enterprise is sepa-
rate and distinct from the pattern of racketeering. United States v. Turkette, 452
U.S. 576 (1981). Thus, the "various associates" of an enterprise "function as a con-
tinuing unit." Id. at 583. Consistent with this holding, lower courts have upheld
the convictions of defendants involved in unrelated crimes and conspiracies who
were convicted in a single prosecution. E.g., United States v. DeLuca, 137 F.3d 24,
36-37 (1st Cir. 1998); Unites States v. Darden, 70 F.3d 1507, 1526-27 (8th Cir.
1996); United States v. Castro, 89 F.3d 1443, 1450-51 (11th Cir. 1996); United
States v. DiNome, 954 F.2d 839, 843-44 (2d Cir. 1992).
218. This concept is linked to the concept of a "chain conspiracy." KAPLAN,
supra note 198, at 974. Before RICO, the government could only prosecute co-
conspirators who could be "linked" in a chain. Id. Subsequently, those conspira-
tors connected only by one pivotal conspirator can now be linked forming a wheel,
hence the government can rim the wheel in a RICO conspiracy.
219. United States v. Elliot, 571 F.2d 880, 898 (5th Cir. 1978).
220. Id. In this case, six defendants and thirty-seven unindicted co-
conspirators were suspected in more than twenty separate criminal pursuits, but
the government was only required to charge a single conspiracy to violate a sub-
2322 [Vol. 27:4
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conspirators have not conspired to do one particular thing like sell
drugs or defraud the government. Rather, the co-conspirators have
agreed to further the same criminal objective-to commit a sub-
stantive RICO offense.2 1
In spite of the distinctions between RICO conspiracy and other
forms of conspiracy, federal courts have held that legal principles
that govern the prosecution of other conspiracy crimes govern
222RICO conspiracy cases as well. Consistent with this determina-
tion, the Court found that the government must prove that the
partners in the criminal plan agreed to pursue the criminal objec-
tive, although each conspirator did not agree to commit or facili-
223tate each and every part of the substantive RICO offense.
In light of the fact that traditional conspiracy principles apply
to RICO conspiracy, numerous common law developments are ap-
plicable as well. For one, the government need not prove that the
defendant participated in, or was aware of all the acts committed in
224furtherance of the conspiracy. The conspirator is liable for acts
committed by other conspirators during the course of and in fur-
225therance of the conspiracy. Co-conspirators must agree to strive
towards a criminal objective and in this process may divide up the
tasks, however, each individual co-conspirator is liable for the acts
226of his partners in crime. When the criminal scheme calls for
some of the partners to commit the crime and others to provide
support, "the supporters are as guilty as the perpetrators.'" The
co-conspirator is liable for the conspiracy even if they could not
stantive RICO provision. Id.
221. Id. at 899.
222. Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 63 (1997) (adhering to the general
rule that well settled terminology of criminal law is given its ordinary meaning).
As a result, the Court determined that when Congress uses the phrase "to con-
spire," as it does in section 1962(d), it intends to use it in its conventional sense
and, as such, certain well-established principles of conspiracy attach. Id. at 63-64.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 53; Blumenthal v. United States, 332 U.S. 539, 557 (1947) (deter-
mining that it is only necessary to prove that the defendant knew of the general
objective of the conspiracy not all the details).
225. Salinas, 522 U.S. at 63; Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 646
(1946).
226. Salinas, 522 U.S. at 63; Pinkerton, 328 U.S. at 646 (stating that so long as
the partnership in crime continues, partners act for each other in carrying it for-
ward).
227. Salinas, 522 U.S. at 64 (noting that in United States v. Holte, 236 U.S. 140,
144 (1915), Justice Holmes determined that "a person may conspire for the com-
mission of a crime by a third person.").
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228
have committed the substantive offense. In fact, a conspiracy will
be found to continue to exist even where the individual conspira-
tors did not agree to "commit or facilitate each and every part of
the substantive offense."
2 9
Thus, a defendant who had minimal participation in the con-
spiracy or was a participant at one level of the conspiracy will be
230convicted of conspiracy. Many lower federal courts have deter-
mined that this means that the Reves "operation or management"
test does not apply to RICO conspiracy. The attempt to reconcile
traditional conspiracy principles with the Reves decision has created
a split between the Second, Seventh, Eleventh, and Fifth Circuits
232on the one hand, and the Third and Ninth Circuits on the other.
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals recently defined the
conflict between the Circuit Courts as being a dispute about how to
233apply the Reves test in light of the Salinas decision. The heart of
this dispute is the issue of personal participation-what level of
personal participation in the enterprise is required to convict a de-
234fendant of RICO conspiracy. In Salinas, the Supreme Court de-
termined that a defendant does not have to commit a predicate of-
fense or an overt act to be found guilty of RICO conspiracy.23 The
Seventh Circuit noted that Reves limits those who can be convicted
of a substantive RICO violation to individuals who operate or man-
236age the affairs of an enterprise. In Reves, the Supreme Court held
228. Salinas, 522 U.S. at 63; United States v. Rabinovich, 238 U.S. 78, 86
(1915).
229. Salinas, 522 U.S. at 63; United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S.
150, 253-54 (1940).
230. United States v. Prieto-Tejas, 779 F.2d 1098, 1103 (5th Cir. 1986).
231. E.g., United States v. Castro, 89 F.3d 1443, 1452 (11th Cir. 1996); United
States v. Napoli, 45 F.3d 660, 680-84 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1084
(1995); MCM Partners, Inc. v. Andrews-Bartlett & Assocs., 62 F.3d 967, 979 (7th
Cir. 1995); United States v. Starrett, 55 F.3d 1525, 1547-1548 (11th Cir. 1995), cert.
denied, 116 S.Ct. 1335 (1996); United States v. Quintanilla, 2 F.3d 1469, 1484-85
(7th Cir. 1993).
232. Compare United States v. Posada-Rios, 158 F.3d 832, 857 (5th Cir. 1998),
and Quintanilla, 2 F.3d at 1484-85, and Starrett, 55 F.3d at 1547, and Napoli, 45 F.3d.
at 683-84, with Neibel v. Trans World Assurance Co., 108 F. 3d 1123, 1128 (9th Cir.
1997), and United States v. Antar, 53 F.3d 568, 581 (3d Cir. 1995).
233. Brouwer v. Raffensperger, Hughes & Co., 199 F.3d 961, 962 (7th Cir.
2000); Posada-Rios, 158 F.3d at 857 (determining that in RICO conspiracy cases, it
was the "better-reasoned rule" to disregard the Reves test in light of the Supreme
Court's decision in United States v. Salinas).
234. Brouwer, 199 F.3d at 966.
235. Salinas, 522 U.S. at 64.
236. Brouwer, 199 F.3d at 966.
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that mere association with an enterprise did not constitute a sub-
237
stantive RICO violation. Attempting to reconcile these two cases,
the Seventh Circuit observed that it is counterintuitive to find
someone guilty of conspiring to commit a substantive crime for
238
which they cannot be convicted. The court resolved this concern
by reasoning that a person who has not committed a substantive
RICO offense but has conspired to violate a substantive RICO of-
fense has not agreed to operate or manage the enterprise, rather
they have agreed "personally to facilitate the activities of those who
do" manage or operate the enterprise. 39
Like all other forms of conspiracy crimes, direct evidence is
not necessary to prove a RICO conspiracy.24° The government does
not have to prove that the defendant knew all the details of the en-
terprise or the number or identities of his coconspirators. 24' The
defendant may be found guilty of RICO conspiracy, if there is cir-
cumstantial evidence from which the jury can infer that the defen-
dant knowingly participated in the overall goal of the conspiracy
itself.24 2 The elements of a conspiracy may be proved by circum-
stantial evidence because it is the nature of the offense that in the
course of the conspiracy, conspirators attempt to conceal their
243conduct. "The agreement, a defendant's guilty knowledge and a
defendant's participation in the conspiracy all may be inferred
from the development and collocation of circumstances." 244  A
meeting of all the actors does not need to take place. 245 A tacit
agreement can be construed from proof that two or more persons
246sought the same criminal goal, through independent actions.
These actions may appear isolated however be deemed con-
237. Id. (quoting Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170 (1993)).
238. Id.
239. Id. at 967.
240. Posada-Rios, 158 F.3d at 857; United States v. Sneed, 63 F.3d 381(5th Cir.
1995) (finding that "no element need be proved by direct evidence: in a conspir-
acy to commit mail fraud").
241. Conspiracy law allows the government to prove only the "essential nature
of the plan" and the conspirator's connection to it to ensure that conspirators do
not avoid prosecution due to their cleverness. Blumenthal v. United States, 332
U.S. 539, 557 (1947).
242. United States v. Fernandez-Roque, 703 F.2d 808, 814-15 (5th Cir. 1983).
243. Posada-Rios, 158 F.3d at 857.
244. United States v. Maltos, 985 F.2d 743, 746 (5th Cir. 1992) (quoting U.S. v.
Gallo, 927 F.2d 815, 820 (5th Cir. 1991).
245. Griffin v. State, 455 S.W.2d 882, 885 (Ark. 1970) (stating a "meeting of
the actors" maybe inferred).
246. Id.
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nected.247 Because the government may prove the conspiracy with
circumstantial evidence, the Defendant may be acquitted of the
substantive RICO violation but found guilty of the RICO conspiracy
charge .14 The defendant may be convicted of conspiracy even if
the underlying substantive offense does not ensue because conspir-
acy is considered a distinct crime-"a distinct evil, dangerous to the
public, and so punishable in itself.,1
49
Most of the circumstantial evidence utilized to prove conspir-
acy crimes comes from the testimony of co-conspirators at trial.
250
Co-conspirators testify in regards to the conduct and statements
made by the defendant in the course of the conspiracy.25' In most
circumstances, out-of-court statements are considered hearsay and
not admissible.15' However, out-of court statements made by a de-
fendant to a co-conspirator in furtherance of the conspiracy are
admissible.25' This is because the co-conspirator who is in a crimi-
nal partnership with the defendant is considered an agent of the
254defendant. In most conspiracy cases, it is followed as a rule that
"persons who are indicted together should be tried together."2 55 AS
a result, co-conspirator testimony presents difficult issues for the
defense since most co-conspirators are prosecuted in a single
247. Id.
248. Salinas v. U.S., 522 U.S. 52, 64 (1997) (citing Callanan v. United States,
364 U.S. 587, 594 (1961) (holding that Congress, in the absence of any inconsis-
tent expression, can maintain a long-established distinction between substantive
offenses and conspiracy)).
249. Id.
250. United States v. Gaytan, 74 F.3d 545, 558 (5th Cir. 1996) (considering
quantity calculations contained in PSR's based on co-conspirator testimony to
convict the defendant); United States v. Powers, 75 F.3d 335, 340 (7th Cir. 1996)
(allowing government to present evidence of defendant's involvement and par-
ticipation in the conspiracy through the testimony of co-conspirators); United
States v. Williams, 56 F.3d 63, 63 (4th Cir. 1995) (same).
251. E.g., United States v. Vaandering, 50 F.3d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1995) (con-
victing defendant of conspiracy to possess methamphetamines with intent to dis-
tribute based on testimony of co-conspirator); Gaytan, 74 F.3d at 558 (considering
quantity calculations contained in pre-sentencing report based on co-conspirator
testimony to convict the defendant); Powers, 75 F.3d at 340 (allowing government
to present evidence of defendant's involvement and participation in the conspir-
acy through the testimony of co-conspirators); Williams, 56 F.3d at 63 (same).
252. FED. R. EviD. 802 (2000).
253. Id. at 801(d) (2) (E). Proving that the defendant's statement was made to
his co-conspirator in the course of the conspiracy need only be proved by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence. Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 175 (1987).
254. Bourjaily, 483 U.S. at 183 (noting that the co-conspirator exception is well
settled in American jurisprudence).
255. United States v. O'Bryant, 998 F.2d 21, 25 (1st Cir. 1993).
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trialf' 6 Primarily, defense counsel is concerned that if the jury con-
siders some of the defendants guilty, it is likely to consider the rest
guilty as well.257 However, multi-defendant trials preserve judicial
and prosecutorial resources and are necessary in the interest ofjus-
258
tice to enable the government to fairly prosecute co-conspirators.
Justice Scalia expressed the views of many when he stated that
"[i] t would impair both the efficiency and the fairness of the crimi-
nal justice system to require ... that prosecutors bring separate pro-
ceedings, presenting the same evidence again and again, requiring
victims and witnesses to repeat the inconvenience (and sometimes
the trauma) of testifying, and randomly facing the last tried defen-
dants who have the advantage of knowing the prosecution's case
beforehand." 259 Joint trials are thought to serve the interest ofjus-
tice because they avoid inconsistent judgments and enable a more
accurate assessment of relative culpability, which may operate to
the advantage of the defendants. As a result of this thought proc-
ess, there is a presumption in favor of multiple defendant trials.
Critics of RICO conspiracy have asserted that it is unconstitu-
tional because it punishes people for their associations in violation
of their First Amendment right to freely associate .2c'o They claim
that a violation of the RICO conspiracy provision amounts to con-
261
spiring to conspire. In essence, individuals are being punished
262
for mere thoughts rather than conduct. As a result, they are be-
ing convicted for their associations.2 6
Courts cognizant of this concern have placed limitations on
the reach of both RICO and other forms of conspiracy. For exam-
ple, an individual may not be convicted of a drug conspiracy merely
because evidence reveals that he associated with drug conspirators
256. Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 206-10 (1987); United States v. Elder,
90 F.3d 1110, 1119 (6th Cir. 1996) (favoring joint trials in conspiracy cases);
United States v. Musquiz, 45 F.3d 927, 931 (5th Cir. 1995) (indicating that joint
trials in conspiracy cases are the preference).
257. Richardson, 481 U.S. at 209.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Miller, supra note 133, at 53; Shawn D. Akers, Note, RICO and Social Pro-
test: DevilifyingA First Amendment Liberty, 11 REGENT U. L. REv. 219, 221 (1998-99);
Barry Tarlow, RICO Report, THE CHAMPION, Apr. 1998, available at http://www.
criminaljustice.org/CHAMPION/ARTICLES/98apr05.htm (last visited Mar. 12,
2001).
261. Miller, supra note 133, at 53.
262. Id.
263. Id.; Akers, supra note 260, at 221; Tarlow, supra note 260.
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or by evidence that places him "in a climate of activity that reeks of
something foul. 2 6" Likewise, mere association with a RICO enter-
265prise does not constitute RICO conspiracy. A defendant's pres-
ence at the scene of a crime is not enough to establish a finding
that the defendant was a conspirator, although a jury may consider
the defendant's presence and participation along with other evi-
266dence in determining that the defendant is guilty of conspiracy.
Moreover, there seems to be almost no distinction between the
existence of an enterprise and the existence of a RICO conspir-
267 268acy. In United States v. Neapolitan, the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals addressed the complexity of the relationship between the
substantive RICO provisions and RICO conspiracy. 69 The court
emphasized that two factors limit the scope of the RICO conspiracy
provision. The first limiting factor identified by the Court was the270
nature of the agreement. The Court reasoned that in examining
the RICO conspiracy, one has entered into two agreements: an
agreement to commit a substantive RICO violation by conducting
or participating in the affairs of an enterprise and an agreement to
the commission of at least two predicate acts. 271 Thus, if a person
committed two acts and did not agree to become involved with the
272enterprise, they have not committed RICO conspiracy. Likewise,
a person who is affiliated with the conspiracy but does not agree to
the commission of two predicate acts is not guilty of RICO conspir-
273acy either.
The second identified limiting factor was the requirement of
proving the existence of the enterprise. The existence of the en-
terprise is what distinguishes a conspiracy from a substantive RICO
274offense. When the enterprise is a legal entity, this issue does notarise because legal enterprises are usually entities with a well-
264. United States v. Maltos, 985 F.2d 743, 746 (5th Cir. 1992) (quoting
United States v. Galvan, 693 F.2d 417, 419 (5th Cir. 1982)).
265. United States v. Neapolitan, 791 F.2d 489, 499 (7th Cir. 1986).
266. United States v. Chavez, 947 F.2d 742, 745 (5th Cir. 1991).
267. Neapolitan, 791 F.2d at 499-50 (stating that a defendant must manifest his
agreement to the objective of a RICO violation and not necessarily agree person-
ally to violate the statute).
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 498-99.
271. Id. at 499.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id.
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defined organizational structure.275 However, when the enterprise
is an "association in fact" enterprise such as the Mexican Mafia, theS 276
government must take particular care in proving its existence. In
particular, it is important to firmly establish the structure of the "as-
sociation in fact" enterprise because the structure is the central
characteristic of an enterprise.277 An "association in fact" enterprise
must be more than "[a] group of people who get together to com-
mit a pattern of racketeering activity."
1. RICO Conspiracy Dismantles The Mexican Mafia
The promulgation of the RICO conspiracy provision reflects
the cleverness of its drafters who were determined to create a form
of conspiracy that would allow the government to dismantle or-
ganizations and prosecute its members and associates for the com-
. 279mission of multiple "unrelated" crimes and conspiracies. Prior to
RICO, if sixteen members of the Mexican Mafia committed unre-
lated crimes and conspiracies to maintain and further the aims of
the gang, the government had no effective way of stopping the
criminal organization.2 80 With the enactment of RICO, this prob-
lem was solved.
28'
In San Antonio, utilization of the RICO conspiracy provision
enabled the government to begin eradicating one of the most
282deadly criminal organizations in Texas, the Mexican Mafia. The
leadership of the Mexican Mafia effectively silenced those "outsid-
ers" who could have provided evidence regarding the deadly activi-
2813ties of the gang. Federal prosecutors had to build their RICO
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Id. at 500.
278. Id.
279. United States v. Sutherland, 656 F.2d 1181, 1192 (5th Cir. 1981) (noting
that "a series of agreements that under pre-RICO law would constitute multiple
conspiracies could under RICO be tried as a single 'enterprise' conspiracy").
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Robbins, Ten are Face Life, supra note 72, at IA (reporting that Assistant
United States Attorney Bill Baumann stated that the government would remain
vigilant in its fight to rid San Antonio of this blood-thirsty gang). Attorney Bill
Baumann stated "we need to keep a foot on the[ir] [sic] throat or they'll be killing
again." Id.
283. The gang leadership had numerous individuals assassinated. Maro Rob-
bins, Gang Trial Verdict Sealed Until Yesterday, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEws, Mar. 3,
1999, at IA.
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conspiracy case from those associated with the gang's activities.8 4
The RICO conspiracy provision allowed prosecutors to target a
broad range of participants for prosecution.' s5 The government
was able to not only prosecute those individuals who committed or
agreed to commit two or more RICO predicate acts but also those
who agreed to furthering or facilitating the goals of the Mexican
Mafia
2. The RICO Conspiracy "Spill-Over"Effect
, 281
In United States v. Robert "Beaver" Perez, ten of the sixteen
originally indicted chose to present their cases to ajury rather than
settle their cases through the plea-bargaining process. Prior to
the onset of the trial, the court denied the motion to sever the
cases of each respective defendant. Instead, the prosecution of all
ten defendants shortly thereafter ensued in a single prosecution.289
These ten defendants, along with their attorneys grimly watched as
federal prosecutors initially presented the government's case to the
jury.29° Assistant United States Attorneys Bill Baumann and David
Counts presented evidence, which established Count one of the in-
dictment-the RICO Substantive violation which included the un-
derlying predicate acts and Count Two-the RICO Conspiracy vio-
lation, substantiating the charges against each defendant.
Prosecutors asserted that the Mexican Mafia was an "association in
fact" enterprise and put on a seemingly endless stream of witnesses
to prove each element of the RICO offenses and each underlying
predicate offense in order to persuade the jury to convict these ten291
men. Overwhelmed by the magnitude of the government's case
against these defendants, observers watched the government's at-
292torneys bombard the jury with a mountain of evidence, which did
284. Interview with Baumann & Counts, supra note 50.
285. Id.
286. Id.; Salinas, 522 U.S. at 64.
287. Criminal No. SA-98-CR-265-EP.
288. Interview with Baumann & Counts, supra note 50.
289. Interview with Ed Camara, Defense Attorney for Michael Perez, one of
the co-defendants in United States v. Robert "Beaver" Perez et al., in San Antonio, Tex.
(Mar. 1, 2000) [hereinafter Interview with Camara].
290. Id.
291. Id.; Interview with Robbins, supra note 58.
292. Interview with Camara, supra note 289; Interview with Robbins, supra note
58.
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lead to the eventual conviction of all ten defendants.293
Defendants with minimal involvement wondered if the jury
could actually distinguish one defendant from another.2 94 As the
trial progressed, they silently questioned whether or not the jury
would be able to associate the appropriate defendant with the evi-
295
dence being presented. They hoped that the jury would hear
their defense regarding their individual involvement or lack of in-
volvement in spite of the monstrosity of the government's case
amidst the terror historically invoked by the Mexican Mafia within
the local community and the presentation of the atrocities that oc-
curred at French Place. 96 One such defendant was Michael Perez
(Michael) who was Beaver's nephew.29' During the course of the
investigation of Beaver, federal law enforcement officials contacted
Michael and asked him to cooperate with their investigation of his
uncle by providing information about Beaver's activities. 29  They
299
threatened to indict him as well if he did not cooperate.
Subsequent to Michael's refusal to cooperate with federal au-
thorities, he was indicted. °° The government's circumstantial evi-
dence suggested a minimal connection between Michael and two
31
predicate acts. Two witnesses testified that Michael drove the ve-
hicles in two drive-up shootings. 1 2 In addition, the government as-
serted that he had participated in meetings where plans for specific
murders had taken place:.°
293. Interview with Camara, supra note 289; Interview with Robbins, supra note
58.
294. Interview with Camara, supra note 289.
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. Marto Robbins, Gang Boss, Other Get Life Sentences, SAN ANTONIO ExPRESS-
NEWS, July 9, 1999, at 2B; Interview with Camara, supra note 289.
298. Interview with Camara, supra note 289.
299. Id.
300. Id. Soon after refusing to provide information to the authorities, his
name, "Michael Perez," began appearing on the affidavits accompanying numer-
ous search warrants in place of the name of another suspect named Michael Val-
dez." Id. Prior to refusing the authorities, all affidavits had listed "Michael Valdez"
in the statement of facts. Id. Immediately afterwards the name "Michael Valdez."
was replaced with that of "Michael Perez." Id. Without explanation, Michael Val-
dez was never implicated in anyway and never indicted although his name ap-
peared in numerous affidavits prior to the threats made to Michael by law en-
forcement officials. Id.
301. Interview with Baumann & Counts, supra note 50; Robbins, supra note
297.
302. Interview with Baumann & Counts, supra note 50.
303. Id.
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In his defense, Mr. Camara, Michael's attorney, hoped to sepa-
rate him, set him apart from his co-defendants in the minds of the
jurors through the presentation of what he considered exculpatory
evidence. 4 Mr. Camara presented evidence through the testimony
of two witnesses who reported that Michael Valdez had been pre-
sent at those meetings rather than Michael Perez and introduced
the affidavits, which reflected the name switching before and after
Michael was threatened by authorities.'O° This evidence was not
persuasive. Michael, along with his codefendants was found guilty
and sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. 6
In the end, the trial before the jury lasted a little over six307
weeks. During that time, the jury heard testimony from over 150
308
witnesses and reviewed over twenty crates of documents. In fact,
there was so much "evidence" for the jury to consider that a larger
deliberation room had to be secured for them.0 9 Prior to retiring
to the jury room for deliberations, the jury listened for over an
hour as the trial judge gave them their instructions.310 Almost a
week later, the jury emerged with a unanimous verdict.
The massive amount of evidence presented by the government
in this trial indicates that RICO conspiracy defendants are sub-jectd ... .. .. . 311
jected to an enhanced "spill-over" effect. "Spill-over" occurs
when there is a gross disparity in the evidence against various co-
defendants. 13 In multi-defendant prosecutions, "[t]he danger is
that the bit players may not be able to differentiate themselves in
the jurors' minds from the stars."314 Consequently, the jury may
merge the defendants and the charges and deliver one big ver-
dict. This "spill-over" effect, inherent in multi-defendant prose-
304. Id.
305. Interview with Camara, supra note 289.
306. Robbins, supra note 297.
307. Maro Robbins, Gang member Gets 15 Years in Plea, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-
NEWS, Apr. 28, 1999, at 2B.
308. Id.
309. Robbins, 10 Face Life, supra note 72, at IA.
310. Interview with Robbins, supra note 58.
311. Herrick, supra note 20.
312. United States v. Andrews, 754 F. Supp. 1161, 1175-1178 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
Here the Court discusses the prejudice experienced by the defendants in the in-
stant case who are charged in a RICO conspiracy. The court notes that this case is
not an ordinary case. Id. at 1175.
313. STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG & DANIELJ. CAPRA, AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
883 (5th ed. 1996).
314. United States v. Zafiro, 945 F.2d 881, 885 (7th Cir. 1991).
315. Id.
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cutions,316 is enhanced in RICO conspiracy prosecutions because
the government is allowed to prosecute multiple unrelated crimes
and conspiracies in a single prosecution. "
In order to discern the enhanced "spill-over" effect in RICO
conspiracy trials, it is necessary to discuss the present process and
related procedures regarding the joinder and severance of co-
defendants. The process of determining severance and joinder is
governed by three respective rules within the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure. Rule 8 authorizes the types of defendants and
charges that can be joined.3 18 Rule 13 allows the court to join sepa-
rate actions if they could have been joined under Rule 8. 3 9 Rule 14
permits the Court to sever or provide other relief if prejudice
would result from joinder.
3 2 0
Rule 8(b) allows the joinder of an unlimited number of de-
fendants "if they are alleged to have participated in the same act or
transaction or in the same series of acts or transactions constituting
an offense or offenses."3 21 The trial judge determines the appropri-
ateness ofjoinder by reviewing the face of the indictment.3 2 When
the indictment alleges that the joined defendants are members of a
323
conspiracy, it is well settled thatjoinder is proper. In most con-
spiracy cases, it is followed as a rule that "persons who are indicted
together should be tried together."3 2 4 Multi-defendant trials are be-
lieved to preserve judicial and prosecutorial resources and to be
necessary in the interest of justice to enable the government to
325
fairly prosecute co-conspirators. Thus, there is a presumption in
favor of joinder. Many believe that it would impair the efficiency
and the fairness of the criminal justice system if prosecutors were
316. United States v. Morales, 868 F.2d 1562, 1573 (lth Cir. 1989); United
States v. McLaurin, 557 F.2d 1064, 1074 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1020
(1978); Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 562 (1967).
317. United States v. Sutherland, 656 F.2d 1181, 1192 (5th Cir. 1981) (stating
that "a series of agreements that under pre-RICO law would constitute multiple
conspiracies could under RICO be tried as a single 'enterprise conspiracy'").
318. Fed. R. Crim. P. 8 (1999).
319. Id. R. 13.
320. Id. R. 14.
321. Id. R. 8.
322. United States v. Bruun, 809 F.2d 397, 406 (7th Cir. 1987); United States v.
Velasquez, 772 F.2d 1348, 1354 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1021 (1986);
United States v. Andrews, 754 F. Supp. 1161, 1168 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
323. United States v. Garner, 837 F.2d 1404, 1412 (7th Cir. 1987), cert denied,
486 U.S. 1035 (1988).
324. United States v. O'Bryant, 998 F.2d 21, 25 (1st Cir. 1993).
325. Id.
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required to bring separate proceedings, "presenting the same evi-
dence again and again, requiring victims and witnesses to repeat
the inconvenience (and sometimes the trauma) of testifying, and
randomly facing the last tried defendants who have the advantage
of knowing the prosecution's case beforehand. 32 6 Furthermore,
multi-defendant trials are thought to serve the interest of justice
because they avoid inconsistent judgments and enable a more ac-
curate assessment of relative culpability, which may operate to the
advantage of the defendants.
Prior to RICO, Rule 8(b) limited the scope of a proper in-
dictment to the number of individuals who could conspire to
commit a single substantive crime or predicate offense.127 RICO
conferred on the government broad charging authority. 328 As a re-
sult, the enactment of RICO conspiracy removed the natural bar-
rier implicit in Rule 8(b) by allowing "'a series of agreements that
under pre-RICO law would constitute multiple [unrelated] con-
spiracies could under RICO be tried as a single 'enterprise conspir-
acy' in violation of § 1962(d)." 29 RICO conspiracy has provided
the government with a more effective, efficient and expansive way
to join multiple defendants and multiple crimes in one prosecu-
tion. 330 For example, a pattern of racketeering can include a limit-
less number of substantive crimes and consequently, a limitless
number of conspirators.33 Inadvertently, the enactment of RICO
contributed to the birth of the mega-trial effectively neutralizing
the implied limitations on the number of defendants that Rule
8(b) placed on the scope of the indictment. 
3
2
Notwithstanding the presumption of joinder in conspiracy
326. Id.
327. United States v. Riccobene, 709 F.2d 214, 222-23 (3d Cir. 1983); United
States v. Sutherland, 656 F.2d 1181, 1192 (5th Cir. 1981).
328. United States v. Andrews, 754 F. Supp. 1161, 1169 n.9 (N.D. Ill. 1990);
United States v. Neapolitan, 791 F.2d 489, 501 (7th Cir. 1986).
329. Andrews, 754 F. Supp. at 1169 & n.9 (quoting Sutherland, 709 F.2d at
1192).
330. Sutherland, 656 F.2d at 1192.
331. Andrews, 754 F. Supp. at 1169 n.9.
332. Id. at 1161. Here, the Court encountered a "mega-trial" where 38 defen-
dants were charged with 175 count indictment under the RICO statute. Id. at
1164. The Court held that, although thejoinder of the defendants was technically
correct, severance was required under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
Rule 14 because the defendants would be prejudiced by the mega-trial. Id. at
1178. This court defined a mega-trial as one in which the government estimates
the length of the trial to be greater than four months, and ten or more defendants
arejoined. Id. at 1172.
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cases, the law recognizes that there are times when justice requires
that a severance be granted.1 3 Although joinder might be techni-
cally correct under Rule 8(b), Rule 14 authorizes severance if such
334
joinder would be prejudicial to the defendants. The trial court
has broad discretion to determine when severance under Rule 14 is
mandated .33 To determine if severance is appropriate the court
must "balance possible prejudice [against the defendants] against
inconvenience and expense to the Government, the court and the
jurors. " s3 6 In Zafiro v. United States, 1 7 the Supreme Court instructed
that a motion for severance should be granted "if there is a serious
risk that a joint trial would compromise a specific trial right of a
properly joined defendant or prevent thejury from making a reli-,,38
able judgment about guilt or innocence. It is important to note
that the Zafiro Court provided guidance regarding the appropri-
ateness of severance absent an understanding of how the existing
joinder and severance procedures are affected by the RICO con-
spiracy provision. To date, the Supreme Court has not recognized
the unique conspiracy created by RICO nor has it identified the
enhanced "spill-over" effect present in RICO conspiracy prosecu-
tions.
Rule 8(b) and Rule 14 may provide adequate procedural pro-
tection against improper joinder to defendants charged with a tra-
ditional form of conspiracy. However, they fall far short in provid-
ing procedural due process protection to RICO conspiracy
defendants, defendants indicted together for conspiring to commit
a substantive RICO offense. The current procedures prevent the
RICO defendant from receiving a fair trial in RICO conspiracy
prosecutions because they do not account for the RICO conspiracy
333. Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 539 (1993).
334. Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 539; United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 447 (1986);
Andrews, 754 F. Supp. at 1169 & n.9 (suggesting that Rule 14 be considered in rela-
tion to Rule 2). Rule 2 states that the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure "are
intended to provide for the just determination of every criminal proceeding. They
shall be construed to secure simplicity in procedure, fairness in administration
and the elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay." FED. R. CRIM. P. 2 (1999).
335. United States v. Caliendo, 910 F.2d 429, 437 (7th Cir. 1990) (noting that
the trial court is in the best position to balance "the cost of conducting separate
trials and the possible prejudice inherent in a single trial").
336. United States v. Pacente, 503 F.2d 543, 549 n.8 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1048 (1974).
337. 506 U.S. 534 (1993).
338. Id. at 539.
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"spill-over" effect.3 39 These rules have not been amended subse-
quent to the enactment of RICO.O The enhanced spill-over effect
of RICO conspiracy has increased the number of defendants and
unrelated offenses listed in the indictment. When the trial judge
reviews the face of the indictment as required by Rule 8(b), he is
not able to discern each individual's participation in relation to the
rest of the participants in the enterprise. The indictment provides• 341
broad language about the defendant's role in the crime. It does
not indicate in what way the defendant personally participated in
the conspiracy.42 The trial judge is unable to determine whether
or not the defendant is a member of the enterprise, a co-
conspirator, both or neither from the face of the indictment.
4
3
Therefore, the trial judge is not able to glean the nature, both in
degree and extent, of each defendant's personal participation. In
other words, the trial judge is not able to determine if the defen-
dant is a member of the enterprise, a member of the single con-
spiracy, which furthered the goal of the enterprise or neither. It
has been suggested that faced with evidence against multiple de-
fendants, a jury will be able to compartmentalize the evidence
against each defendant and deliver a fair verdict. Due to the en-
hanced "spill-over" effect created by RICO conspiracy, the jury can-
not "compartamentalize the evidence against one defendant
339. Rules 8, 13 and 14 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure represent
the statutory procedures in place for determining severance. Fed. R. Crim. P. 8,
13, 14 (1999).
340. Fed. R. Crim. P. 8, 13,14 (1999).
341. Perez Indictment, supra note 26, at 22 (stating that on or about November
23, 1994, Frank Estrada, aided by MARTIN "PANCAKE" ORTEGON, MICHAEL
PEREZ, and ROBERT "ROBE" OR "ROVE" HERRERA, JR., shot and killed Luis
"Blue" Adames.") This language is vague and does not describe to the judge spe-
cifically what the defendant did. The indictment does not state how the defen-
dant manifested his "agreement" to conspire to violate 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (c)
(1998)).
342. Id.
343. Id. The indictment is a persuasive piece of legal writing intended to jus-
tify the charges against the defendants. From the face of this indictment, the
reader is unable to discern each defendant's degree or level of involvement. It
could be argued that evidence regarding degree and level of involvement is better
presented at the time of the trial. It is important to note, however, that the value
of severance is lost once the trial begins.
344. U.S. v. Elder, 90 F.3d 110, 119-20 (6th Cir. 1996) (discussing
compartmentalization). Currently, the United States Supreme Court has
determined that "spill-over" effect may be cured and juries will be able to
compartmentalize the evidence if proper jury instructions are given. Zafiro v.
United States, 506 U.S. 534, 541 (1993)
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from another. In effect, a RICO conspiracy defendant is denied
the opportunity to present his defense to an impartial jury.45
III. RICO CONSPIRACY & PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
A joinder-severance procedure that fails to account for the
RICO conspiracy "spill-over" effect substantially impairs the RICO
conspiracy defendant's ability to present his case to a fair and im-
partial jury in violation of the Sixth Amendment. The failure of this
process constitutes a violation of the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment.3 46 "Procedural due process imposes constraints
on governmental decisions which deprive individuals of 'liberty' or
'property' interests within the meaning of the Due Process Clause
• ,"347
of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment. Procedural due process
provides that a person can only be deprived of certain substantive
rights-life, liberty, and property pursuant to constitutionally ade-
quate procedures.
A. Mathews v. Eldridge: A Standard Of Review In Criminal Fact-
Finding
To determine the sufficiency of procedural protections, most
courts employ the procedural due process standard established in
Mathews v. Eldridge by the Supreme Court.3 50 In this case, the
Court found that to determine the constitutional sufficiency of ex-
isting procedures required an analysis of the governmental and pri-
vate interests concerned.3 51 - This test requires that three factors be
examined to determine if the requisites of due process have been
met.35 "First, the private interest that will be affected by the official
action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such an in-
terest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any,
of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the
345. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (declaring that "the
fundamental requirement of due process is that the defendant be provided with
the opportunity to present his defense to a jury 'at a meaningful time and in a
meaningful manner'").
346. Supra notes 282-345 and accompanying text (discussing the current pro-
cedures and presenting their insufficiency in RICO conspiracy prosecutions).
347. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 332.
348. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985).
349. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
350. R.G. Britton v. Rogers, 631 F.2d 572, 580 (8th Cir. 1980).
351. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
352. United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 677 (1980).
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Government's interest, including the function involved and the fis-
cal and administrative burdens that additional or substitute proce-
dural requirements would entail.",
53
Traditionally, the Mathews v. Eldridge test has been utilized to
determine the sufficiency of procedural safeguards in the context
354of administrative proceedings. In the criminal context, one stan-
dard for determining the sufficiency of procedural protections has
remained elusive.355 It is likely that this lapse can be explained by
examining the nature of due process itself. The Supreme Court
noted that "unlike some legal rules [due process] is not a technical
conception with fixed content unrelated to time, place and circum-
stances. "356 Due Process is "flexible" and requires a fresh assess-
ment of each individual situation to determine what procedural
351protections are required to satisfy the requisites of due process.
In the criminal realm, the individual defendant is subjected to a
number of different proceedings, which have been determined to
require different degrees of procedural protections and vastly dif-
ferent procedures. It is not being suggested that every single
criminal proceeding requires that a new set of procedural safe-
guards be implemented. But every type of criminal proceeding may
require its own set of procedural due process protections, which
seems to be what has developed within the criminal context, par-
ticularly in the cases which have utilized the Mathews v. Eldridge test
in the criminal context.
The application of this test was first adopted by the Eighth Cir-
353. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335; E.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S 254, 271 (1970).
354. X G. Britton, 631 F.2d at 580. In this case, the eighth circuit noted that the
Mathews test was originally developed to be applied in the administrative context
but that it did not "perceive any doctrinal obstacle" to its utilization in the criminal
context. Id. At that time, no federal court, other than the lower court on review,
had yet applied the Mathews standard to review procedures in a criminal proceed-
ing. Id.
355. Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 437 (1992) (noting that there are sev-
eral ways to evaluate the sufficiency of procedural safeguards).
356. Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961); Bowen v. City of
New York, 476 U.S. 483, 485 (1986) (noting that the Mathews test should not be
mechanically applied).
357. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335; Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
358. E.g., Medina, 505 U.S. 437; Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 77-84 (1985);
United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667 (1980); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668 (1984); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335 (1963); Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12
(1956).
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cuit Court of Appeals in R.G. Britton v. Rogers.159 Here the Court
noted that in Mathews v. Eldridge the Supreme Court emphasized
that "procedural due process rules are shaped by the risk of error
inherent in the truth-finding process." '  The Eighth Circuit de-
termined that under a Mathews v. Eldridge analysis additional pro-
cedures were valued to the degree in which they reduced the possi-
361bility of factual error.
The opinion of the Eighth Circuit was later manifested in two
cases in which the United States Supreme Court invoked the
Mathews test to resolve procedural due process claims in two dis-
tinct aspects of criminal procedure, which involved the determina-
362tion of factual issues. Initially, the Court applied the Mathews
procedural due process test to determine the constitutionality of a
process outlined in the Federal Magistrate Act, 28 U.S.C. §
636(b) (1) (B). This statutory provision allows a district judge to
designate a magistrate to conduct hearings regarding suppression
of evidence and recommend a decision to the district judge regard-
ing the defense's motion to suppress. The district judge makes his
decision, reviewing de novo the recommendation and developed
record before coming to a decision. Later, the Court applied the
Mathews test to determine whether or not procedural due process
required that an indigent defendant be provided with a psychiatrist
when his mental condition is a relevant part of the defense. In this
second case, Ake v. Oklahoma, Justice Marshall established con-
cretely the validity of applying the Mathews analysis to procedural
due process claims, which arise in a criminal context and involve an
issue of fact-finding.
359. RG. Britton, 631 F.2d at 579-581 (determining that the sufficiency of the
procedural safeguards in place in the sentencing process of the State of Arkansas
by applying the Mathews procedural due process test).
360. Id. at 580.
361. Id.
362. Medina, 505 U.S. at 437; e.g., Ake, 470 U.S. at 77-84 (utilizing the proce-
dural due process test of Mathews to determine whether or not due process re-
quired that an indigent defendant be provided with a psychiatrist when his mental
condition is a relevant part of the defense); Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667 (invoking the
Mathews procedural due process test to determine the adequacy of the procedural
protections of process established in the Federal Magistrate Act, 28 U.S.C. §
636(b) (1) (B), which allows district judge to designate a magistrate to conduct
hearings regarding suppression of evidence upon which the districtjudge will have
de novo review of outcome).
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B. Application OfMathews v. Eldridge In TheJoinder &
Severance Process Of RICO Conspiracy Prosecutions
1. The Private Interest Of The RICO Conspiracy Defendant
A RICO conspiracy defendant faces the loss of his freedom, a
liberty interest, if convicted of the charge. 63 The term of impris-
onment can be for many years and possibly his entire life. In the
Ake case, Justice Marshal noted that "[t] he private interest in the
accuracy of a criminal proceeding that places an individual's life or
liberty at risk is almost uniquely compelling."3 65 In the United
States, the importance of accuracy in criminal proceedings is re-
flected in the "host of safeguards" that have been developed by the
Supreme Court since the inception of the Court.366 Due process
does not provide an impenetrable barrier to be free from physical
restraint. Instead, it guarantees a fair process of decision-making,
which works to protect an individual from the arbitrary loss of his
freedom. 66 In addition, it stands for the proposition that funda-
mental fairness requires that the criminal defendant have "an ade-
quate opportunity to present their claims fairly within the adversary
system.
2. A Proposed Additional Procedure
In the second phase of the Mathews v. Eldridge analysis, it is
necessary to assess the risk of erroneously depriving the RICO con-
spiracy defendant of his liberty. The nature of the private interest
in question calls for a careful consideration of this issue. In Perez, all
ten defendants, despite their level of involvement, faced a sentence
310of life imprisonment without parole. In essence, the balance of
their lives was at issue in determining whether or not their cases
should be severed. Several factors earlier discussed indicate that
there is a strong chance that the RICO conspiracy defendant will be
363. 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (a)(1999).
364. Id.
365. Ake, 470 U.S. at 78.
366. Id.
367. Pac. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 28-32 (1991) (Scalia, J., concur-
ring) (discussing the definition and attributes of due process).
368. Id.
369. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 612 (1974).
370. Maro Robbins, Last Gang Member Given Life Sentence, SAN ANTONIO ExPRESS-
NEws, July 10, 1999, at 2B.
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erroneously deprived of his freedom. These factors arise from the
enhanced spill-over effect inherent in RICO conspiracy prosecu-
tions.371 It is not reasonable to expect ajury to be able to accurately
assess each defendant's culpability based "solely upon that defen-
dant's own acts, statements and conduct" in the face of a mammoth
amount of evidence generated by the government and numerous
defendants upon whom to discern.72 The risk of erroneous depri-
vation is high in light of the fact that the courts do not identify
these factors and severance decisions are made with the backdrop
of a presumption in favor ofjoint trials. 373
To decrease the substantial risk of erroneously depriving the
RICO conspiracy defendant of his liberty, the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure should be amended to account for the issues
that arise in the joinder-severance process due to the enhanced
"spill-over" effect present in RICO conspiracy prosecutions. Specifi-
cally, a provision should be added to Rule 8 that reflects such a
consideration. The proposed provision should require the govern-
ment to file along with the indictment a separate memorandum to
the court, which specifically enumerates what conduct the govern-
ment intends to prove against each defendant. Procedurally, the
Memorandum of Specific Conduct (MOSC) should be filed with
the court for inspection in camera and discussed in an ex parte
hearing to protect the work product of the Assistant United States
Attorney (AUSA).
The MOSC should specify for each co-defendant the "who,
what, when, where and how" that comprises the basis of the gov-
374emnent's indictment. In essence, the government would be re-
quired to "plead" the offense with particularity. The specificity of
the MOSC would allow the judge to make an informed decision re-
garding severance based on specific conduct and circumstances. In
addition, it would give her a more complete view of the enterprise,
including its structure, racketeering activities and alleged level of
371. Supra notes 287-345 and accompanying text (discussing the current pro-
cedures and presenting their insufficiency in RICO conspiracy prosecutions).
372. United States v. Fernandez, 892 F.2d 976, 990 (11 th Cir. 1989).
373. Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 539 (1993).
374. C.f United States v. Smithkline Beecham Clinical Lab., Inc., No. CIV. A.
96-1380, 2000 WL 17838, at *3 (E.D. La. Jan. 10, 2000) (describing the require-
ments of Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and noting that, in
pleadings, plaintiffs are required to plead "averments of fraud or mistake" with
particularity).
375. Id.
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individual participation among the alleged co-conspirators. The
proposed provision would increase judicial efficiency by setting out
the case for the judge in advance of trial. With this view of the case,
the judge would be alerted to specific issues in the case and be pre-
pared to address them more effectively in pre-trial proceedings.
The MOSC would allow the judge to make a meaningful and in-
formed decision in regards to severance. The inadequacies of the
current procedures encourage the trial judge who attempts to con-
template the need for severance to decide in favor ofjoinder; a de-
featist attitude of "wait and see" in hopes of working it out in trial.376
Unfortunately for the RICO conspiracy defendant, this wait and see
attitude comes too late, when conviction is inevitable and success in
appeal is remote.
3. The Governmental Interest
Finally, the government's interest must be considered. Gener-
ally, the government has a huge stake in the joinder decision.
Multi-defendant trials are economically as well as strategically ad-
377vantageous to the government. Both the judiciary and the prose-
378
cution conserve a vast amount of resources. Witnesses are not
subjected to multiple trials, allowing the government to present the
entire case at one time.3 79 For these reasons joint trials are consid-
ered "an essential element of the quick administration of judg-
ment."  At the same time, these obvious governmental concerns
must be tempered "by [the government's] interest in the fair and
accurate adjudication of criminal cases. Thus, the government
cannot maintain the strategic advantage provided by the creation
of RICO conspiracy over co-defendants if the result of that advan-
tage would place the accuracy of the verdict at issue.
2
Complying with this proposed provision would add minimal
burden to the government because of the existing policies within
the Department of Justice regarding RICO prosecutions. The Jus-
tice Department recognizes that RICO prosecutions are "different"
376. Interview with Camara, supra note 289.
377. Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 536 (1993); Richardson v. Marsh,
481 U.S. 200, 209 (1987).
378. United States v. Andrews, 754 F. Supp. 1161, 1171 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
379. Id.
380. United States v. Walters, 913 F.2d 388, 393 (7th Cir. 1990).
381. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 79 (1985).
382. See generally Ake, 470 U.S. at 79.
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and has adopted internal procedures, which ensure enhanced su-
pervision of RICO prosecutions. The assigned AUSA is already
required to prepare an internal document with much more detail
than is being proposed for the MOSC.
8 4
In addition to building the case with the evidence at hand in
preparation for grand jury proceedings and formulation of the in-
dictment, the AUSA must prepare along with her internal prosecu-
tion memorandum, an additional memorandum that summarizes
the case in every detail. These documents are forwarded to the
Organized Crime & Racketeering Section of the Criminal Division
of the Department of Justice in Washington D.C. for approval to
move forward with the RICO prosecution .3 6 A case will not be filed
under the RICO statute without this approval s. v If the AUSA was
required to submit the Memorandum of Specific Conduct to the
court along with the indictment, the AUSA would merely need to
draw from this existing document to comply with the proposed
383. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S MANUAL Ch. 110 (1992).
384. Id. Another benefit of adopting the requirement to generate a Memo-
randum of Specific Conduct is that many courts believe that the prosecution
shares the burden of ensuring that the proceedings are fair in multi-defendant
prosecutions. See United States v. Andrews, 754 F. Supp. 1197, 1199 (N.D. Ill.
1990) (noting that government has the responsibility to assist courts in developing
an equitable severance plan because the government is the only party with knowl-
edge of evidence prior to trial); see also United States v. Casamento, 887 F.2d 1141,
1152 (2d Cir. 1989) (noting that district courts should receive assistance from gov-
ernment in severing a mega-trial to ensure a fair and efficient plan of severance).
385. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATToRNEY's MANUAL Ch. 110 (1992).
386. Id. In determining the appropriateness of the "fit", the AUSA must con-
sider the specific advantages and disadvantages of charging under the RICO stat-
ute related to her case. U.S. Department ofJustice, Criminal Division, Organized
Crime & Racketeering Section, Douglas E. Crow & Miriam Banks, Racketeering Stat-
utes In Gang Prosecutions 1, 1 (Apr. 22, 1998). In the prosecution of gangs, the
AUSA may take advantage of numerous benefits. Id. For one, the prosecution
may try defendants who were members of the enterprise together. Id. In addition,
the prosecutor may join a number of crimes together including state crimes,
crimes committed in other jurisdictions, and crimes where the statute of limita-
tions has run. Id. In addition, there are numerous evidentiary advantages. The
AUSA will be able to get evidence from other crimes admitted. Id. Furthermore,
rather than being restricted to presentation of evidence about a single crime or a
series of crimes, the AUSA will be able to introduce evidence concerning the exis-
tence of the criminal organization and the defendant's contact with it. Id. Finally,
the AUSA will be able to consider sentencing benefits and the possibility of forfei-
tures. Id. Of some concern may be the added complexity of charging under
RICO. Preparation and presentation of the evidence must be carefully considered
and facilitated in a way that even the most unsophisticated ofjurors could under-
stand. Id.
387. Id.
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provision.
IV. CONCLUSION
The RICO conspiracy statute ingeniously allows the govern-
ment to dismantle a criminal organization through the prosecution
of its members and those associated with it for a variety of crimes in
one trial. RICO conspiracy provides the government with a more
efficient, effective and expansive way to make this strike. In the
process, it prevents the RICO defendant from having a fair trial in
violation of the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause. A constitu-
tional violation occurs because there is a substantial increase in the
likelihood that the jury in a multi-defendant RICO prosecution will
not be able to make an accurate judgment because of the resulting
enhanced spill-over effect. Hence, the RICO conspiracy defendant
will effectively be prevented from having a fair trial.
Due Process is a dynamic concept that requires such proce-
dural protections as each individual situation necessitates. The
proposed Memorandum of Specific Conduct would allow the judge
to consider the merits of a motion to sever in a more meaningful
way than with an indictment alone. By providing additional proce-
dural safeguards in the pretrial process, alleged RICO co-
conspirators will be ensured a fair trial. It is important to reflect
upon the fact that "mere access to the courthouse doors does not
by itself assure a proper functioning of the adversary process.
"
3
The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure must provide the RICO
conspiracy defendant with a meaningful way to individualize his
case in relation to his co-defendants.
388. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 77 (1985).
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